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THE SUBPRIME CRISIS—A TEST MATCH FOR 





 The United States has just experienced one of the worst financial 
crises in all its history.  Several investment banks failed or had to be bailed 
out by the federal government.  They included such behemoths as Merrill 
Lynch, Bear Stearns, Morgan Stanley and Lehman Brothers.1  Some 140 
commercial banks failed in 2009 as a result of the crisis,2 and several large 
commercial banks had to be rescued or bailed out as well, including 
Citigroup, Bank of America and Wachovia Corp.3  Several giant residential 
mortgage lenders failed, including Washington Mutual, Countrywide 
Financial, and IndyMac.  The American International Group, Fannie Mae, 
and Freddie Mac failed, as did General Motors and Chrysler.  The economy 
suffered as well, with unemployment levels reaching nearly ten percent 
nationwide and even higher in some states.4  Total job losses exceeded 7.2 
million.5
 
 * Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law at Miami.  The 
author wishes to thank Justin C. Carlin, Senior Research Fellow at FIU for his assistance in 
preparing this article. 
  The problem spread worldwide.  In the United Kingdom, 
financial services crippled by the crisis included the Royal Bank of 
Scotland, Lloyds TSB, and Northern Rock.  Banks in Germany and France 
 1. Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, The End of the Financial World As We Know It, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at WK9; Louise Story, Extreme Makeover at Morgan Stanley, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2008, at B1. 
 2. The Associated Press, Seven Bank Failures Bring the Total to 106 for the Year, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2009, at B4. 
 3. See Eric Dash, Seeking A Roadway To Solvency, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2008, at B1 
(explaining that after Citigroup received its second multi-billion dollar rescue from 
Washington, rivals Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo could line up for 
additional support). 
 4. The Associated Press, Rise in New Jobless Claims Was Higher Than Expected, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, at B8. 
 5. Id. 
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had to be rescued too.  Ireland and Iceland’s major banks had to be bailed 
out or nationalized.6
 This debacle touched off a debate about whether the 1999 Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act’s (“GLBA”) removal of the dividing line between 
commercial and investment banking activities
 
7—which had been 
implemented by the Glass-Steagall Act of 19338—laid the groundwork for 
the subprime crisis.9
II. SOME BANKING HISTORY 
  This article will address that debate.  It first traces the 
background for the adoption of the Glass-Steagall Act and describes the 
successful efforts to undermine its proscriptions through the use of so-
called “Section 20” subsidiaries and other devices.  The article also 
describes the events that led to the passage of the GLBA and addresses 
whether it laid the groundwork for the subprime crisis.  The article 
concludes that it did not. 
A. Background 
 Banking in the United States has a colorful but confusing history 
that is laced with populist resentments and fears of concentrated wealth in 
banks and other commercial enterprises, concerns that are commonly 
associated with Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson.  Opposing the 
Jeffersonian populists were Alexander Hamilton and his supporters, who 
viewed banks and other aspects of big business to be a necessary part of 
building and maintaining a national economy.  This debate over the role of 
banks in society has been, at least before the subprime crisis, purely an 
American one.  The American experience is colored by the fact that during 
the colonial period, the English Crown effectively prohibited banking in the 
colonies.10
 
 6. For a description of the failures occurring during the subprime crisis, see DAVID 
WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST 229, 233 (2009). 
  This left the nation to develop its own banking system after the 
Revolution.  Hamilton, as Secretary of the Treasury, laid the groundwork 
 7. Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 
Stat. 1338, 1341 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-09 (2006)). 
 8. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended 
at 12 U.S.C. § 227 (1988)). 
 9. See, e.g., LAWRENCE G. MCDONALD & PATRICK ROBINSON, A COLOSSAL FAILURE OF 
COMMON SENSE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF LEHMAN BROTHERS 7 (2009) 
(noting that the Financial Services Modernization Act was “directly responsible for bringing 
the entire world to the brink of financial ruin”). 
 10. See Christian C. Day, Dispersed Capital and Moral Authority: The Paradox of 
Success in the Unregulated 19th Century New York Capital Markets, 12 LAW & BUS. REV. 
AM. 303, 304 (2006) (noting that the British Parliament extended the Bubble Act to the 
colonies, requiring the creation of all joint stock corporations to obtain the permission of 
Parliament or the Crown). 
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for that effort through a 1970 proposal for the creation of a “Bank of the 
United States” (“BUS”), which would perform the functions of a central 
bank.11  Hamilton’s proposal for this central bank was modeled after the 
Bank of England and, to some extent, the central banks on the continent.12  
His recommendation proved to be controversial.  Some cabinet members, 
including Attorney General Edmund Randolph and Secretary of State 
Thomas Jefferson—who believed that “banking establishments are more 
dangerous to our liberties than standing armies”13—opposed Hamilton’s 
proposal, as did James Madison.  However, President Washington threw 
his support behind Hamilton and refused to veto the legislation that created 
the BUS.  This schism laid the groundwork for the division along party 
lines of the federal government that exists today.14
 Even Hamilton concluded that the BUS should be a creature with 
limited powers.  He believed that it should be safeguarded from 
commercial and speculative operations.
 
15  The bank’s charter, therefore, 
prohibited the BUS from investing in land or buildings and from dealing in 
goods, wares, merchandise, or commodities.  It further provided that 
bounties would be paid to anyone reporting violations of those 
proscriptions.16  Despite those limitations, the BUS became a commercial 
success with five branches operating around the country.  It was also a 
valuable asset for the federal government, allowing the executive branch to 
borrow $6 million by 1796.17
 The BUS became a victim of its own success.  Competing private 
banks resented the BUS and were able to prevent its charter renewal by the 
Congress in 1811.
 
18  The liquidation of the BUS as a national bank left the 
country adrift financially, leading to a financial crisis during the War of 
1812.19  Awakening to its value, Congress chartered a new BUS in 1816.20
 
 11. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 344 (2004). 
  
 12. See id. at 347 (2004) (noting that Hamilton “stressed his desire to catch up with 
European experience”). 
 13. WILLIAM F. HIXSON, TRIUMPH OF THE BANKERS: MONEY AND BANKING IN THE 18TH 
AND 19TH CENTURIES 94 (1993) (citation omitted). 
 14. For an account of this debate in the Washington cabinet see WILLARD STERNE 
RANDALL, THOMAS JEFFERSON: A LIFE 505-07 (1993) (describing the debates surrounding 
Hamilton’s proposal). 
 15. 1 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM 
CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492-1900) 89 (2002). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 90. 
 18. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the Federal 
Response, and the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1133, 1153 (1990) (explaining that agrarian and state bank interests defeated the 
rechartering of the first BUS). 
 19. MARKHAM, supra note 15, at 89. 
 20. Id. at 134. 
MARKHAMFINALIZED_THREE_UPDATED 9/9/2010  4:47 PM 
1084 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:4 
 
The second BUS became a source of financial stability and was even able 
to exercise some supervisory control over private banks that were often 
irresponsible in their operations.21
 Despite its usefulness, populist politicians—who thought the BUS 
had aggregated too much power unto itself—despised the second BUS.  Its 
chief critic was General Andrew Jackson, the hero of New Orleans, who 
vowed its destruction during his presidential campaign.  True to his word, 
after becoming president, Jackson destroyed the second BUS following an 
epic political struggle with Henry Clay.  Clay had made that fight the 
centerpiece for his own campaign for President.  Jackson prevailed, but the 
country was left without a central bank until 1913.
 
22
 Following the demise of the second BUS, banks became solely 
creatures of the states, and were regulated only loosely by state 
governments.
 
23  However, the Civil War led to the creation of national bank 
charters and a “dual” banking system.  Under this system, a bank could 
choose to be regulated by its own state regulators by adopting a state 
charter, or could elect to be a national bank regulated by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) in the Treasury Department.24  
Unlike national banks, state banks were prohibited from issuing their own 
notes that could act, as had previously been the case, as a circulating 
currency.  This did not deter the state banks, however, because their 
depository facilities and checking operations were still a valuable service 
for customers.25
 
 21. See Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privileges to General Utility: A Continuation 
of Willard Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 99 (1999) (noting the large 
number of state-chartered banks that engaged in questionable financial practices). 
 
 22. For a description of the battle between Jackson and Clay over the bank, see ARTHUR 
M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 74-131 (1945) (discussing the beginning of the 
bank war, the veto, and the counterattack). 
 23. In 1846, further legislation was passed that removed all federal funds from private 
state banks and deposited them in Treasury Department offices.  This completely separated 
the federal government from the private money markets.  Raichle v. Fed. Reserve Bank of 
N.Y., 34 F.2d 910, 912 (2d Cir. 1929). 
 24. Judge Augustus N. Hand described the creation of the national banking system as 
follows: 
To meet the necessities of Civil War, national banks were established. They 
became the official depositaries of the government and furnished an enlarged 
currency, because of their ability to issue circulating notes against government 
bonds deposited with the Treasurer of the United States. They were required to 
maintain reserves in certain cities, based upon a percentage of their deposits. 
Raichle, 34 F.2d at 912. 
 25. BRAY HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EMPTY PURSE: BANKS AND POLITICS IN THE 
CIVIL WAR 335 (1970). 
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B. Banking Powers 
 The state banks had been leaders in investment banking and were 
free to engage in underwriting and dealing activities in stocks.26  National 
banks, however, were restricted in their investment and operation powers to 
matters specified in the National Bank Act of 1864,27 plus any “incidental” 
powers needed to carry out that business.28  For example, Section twenty-
eight of that legislation restricted national banks to real estate holdings in 
properties necessary to transact their own businesses and to real estate 
mortgages only as security or payment for “previously contracted” debts.29  
Dealing in stocks by national banks was “not expressly prohibited; but such 
a prohibition [was] implied from the failure to grant the power.”30  National 
banks were allowed to broker securities for customers,31 but the OCC ruled 
in 1902 that national banks did not have the power to act as underwriters of 
stocks.32  As will be seen, the Comptroller’s ruling laid the foundation for 
the prohibitions in the Glass-Steagall Act that divided commercial and 
investment banking activities.33
 
 26. George G. Kaufman & Larry R. Mote, Glass-Steagall: Repeal by Regulatory and 
Judicial Reinterpretation, 107 BANKING L.J. 388, 391-92 (1990). 
  Before the passage of that legislation, 
 27. National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 21 et seq. (2006)). 
 28. First Nat’l Bank of Charlotte v. Nat’l Exch. Bank of Balt., 92 U.S. 122, 127 (1875). 
 29. 12 U.S.C. § 28. 
 30. First Nat’l Bank of Charlotte, 92 U.S. at 122. 
 31. Block v. Pa. Exch. Bank, 170 N.E. 900, 901 (N.Y. 1930). 
 32. David M. Eaton, The Commercial Banking-Related Activities of Investment Banks 
and Other Nonbanks, 44 EMORY L.J. 1187, 1192 n.20 (1995).  This separation of investment 
and commercial banking activities seemed to be based on the English model that: 
made a sharp division between the types of institutions participating in the 
commercial banking and investment banking functions. Recognized banking 
authorities there considered investment banking an inherently risky and 
speculative venture and, for that reason, considered any dealings in stocks and 
bonds an improper business pursuit for financial institutions entrusted with the 
savings of the general public. To a greater extent than we are apt to realize, 
what in the United States is generally meant by conservative, or sound, banking 
practice is simply the tacit acceptance of English standards. 
Edwin J. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88 
BANKING L.J. 483, 485 (1971).  The English abandoned that approach in the “Big Bang” 
regulatory reforms that were ushered into the London markets in 1986.  Danny Fortson, The 
Day Big Bang Blasted the Old Boys Into Oblivion, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 29, 2006, at 6. 
 33. One author describes the dividing line between commercial and investment banks at 
the end of the eighteenth century as follows: 
Prior to 1900, commercial and investment banking were generally conducted by 
wholly separate entities. Although no explicit law prohibited the intermingling 
of deposit/loan banks with securities underwriting, judicial decisions effectively 
proscribed it. (No such limitations applied to solely state-chartered institutions.) 
Pursuant to case law, the Comptroller of the Currency issued administrative 
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however, several large national banks used a bit of legal legerdemain to 
evade the Comptroller’s ruling.  The banks concluded they could do 
indirectly that which they could not do directly, by creating affiliates that 
would do the underwriting. 
 Leading that effort was the National City Co., an affiliate of the 
National City Bank, which was controlled by the Rockefellers and the J.P. 
Morgan investment banking firm, and which, ironically, eventually became 
Citigroup Inc.34  The National City Co. was funded with a forty percent 
dividend on its twenty-five million dollars in stock, which was assigned to 
three bank officers acting as trustees with the sole power to vote the 
National City stock.  Unlike the bank, the National City Co. had no 
limitations on its powers and could engage in any lawful business.35
 In 1911, the U.S. Solicitor General, Fredrick W. Lehman, 
considered whether the National City Bank’s affiliation with the National 
City Co. violated banking laws.  Lehman noted that the National City Co. 
had invested in the shares of sixteen banks and trust companies, as well as 
other businesses.  Lehman asserted that these investments raised the specter 
of National City gaining control over large banks nationwide: 
 
The temptation to the speculative use of the funds of the banks at 
opportune times will prove to be irresistible. Examples are recent 
and significant of the peril to a bank incident to the dual and 
diverse interests of its officers and directors. If many enterprises 
and many banks are bought and bound together in the nexus of a 
great holding corporation, the failure of one may involve all in a 
common disaster. And, if the plan should prosper, it would mean 
a union of power in the same hands over industry, commerce and 
finance, with a resulting power over public affairs, which was the 
gravamen of objections to the United States Bank.36
 Lehman concluded that the National City Company’s holding of the 
stocks of other national banks was “in usurpation of federal authority and 




edicts proclaiming the impermissibility of crossover. After the turn of the 
century, however, increased demand for capital spurred the Comptroller to let 
commercial national banks underwrite corporate and municipal debt, though 
equity issues remained the domain of the investment banking houses. 
  However, Franklin MacVeagh, the 
Eaton, supra note 32, at 1192 (citations omitted). 
 34. See 2 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM 
J.P. MORGAN TO THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (1900-1970) 23 (2002) (noting that after the 
Comptroller of the Currency ordered the national banks to restrict their underwriting 
activities, banks responded by forming banking affiliates who could still underwrite). 
 35. See JOHN K. WINKLER, THE FIRST BILLION: THE STILLMANS AND THE NATIONAL 
CITY BANK 202-03 (1934) (finding that the National City Company had made investments 
in multiple banks and trust companies and thereby became a holding company of banks). 
 36. Id. at 206 (emphasis provided). 
 37. Id. 
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Secretary of the Treasury and a former long time director of the 
Commercial National Bank of Chicago, disagreed with that claim.38  The 
matter was then submitted to President William H. Taft, who Franklin A. 
Vanderlip—president of the National City Bank—and Henry P. 
Davidson—a partner at J.P. Morgan—convinced to suppress the Solicitor 
General’s opinion at a secret White House meeting in 1911.39  “The 
original copy of the Lehman opinion had disappeared from the files of the 
Justice Department sometime prior to 1913, so that only a carbon copy 
remained.”40  The Senate Banking and Currency Committee discovered the 
copy of Lehman’s opinion during its inquiry into the Stock Market Crash 
of 1929.  In May 1932, Senator Carter Glass dramatically revealed its 
existence in a floor speech in the Senate, laying the groundwork for the 
passage of the Glass-Steagall Act in the following year.41
C. The Fed 
 
 The nation experienced one of its most serious economic crises 
during the Panic of 1907, an event that was marked by a privately mounted 
effort to rescue faltering financial institutions.  During that panic, J.P. 
Morgan famously locked a group of bankers in his library until they could 
reach agreement on a rescue package.42  In response to that crisis, Congress 
passed the Aldrich-Vreeland Currency Act in 1908, which created the 
National Monetary Commission for the purpose of studying and proposing 
changes to the banking structure that would prevent another such panic.43  
Senator Nelson Aldrich served as the head of the Commission, but private 
bankers largely controlled the lengthy and detailed studies that it 
conducted.44
 Disguised as duck hunters, a group of those bankers met on 
Georgia’s Jekyll Island in 1910 and came up with a plan for a central 




 38. FERDINAND LUNDERG, AMERICA’S 60 FAMILIES 102-03 (1937). 
  Democrats blocked that 
proposal, but Congressman Carter Glass from Virginia—the future co-
 39. See id. (noting that, with this decision, “Taft threw a very special favor in the way 
of the Rockefellers’ National City Bank and became personally responsible for the sinister 
flowering of bank securities affiliates”). 
 40. Perkins, supra note 32, at 517. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR, THE PANIC OF 1907 (2007) (describing the 
1907 panic).  For a description of Morgan’s role in this rescue, see JEAN STROUSE, MORGAN:  
AMERICAN FINANCIER 573-96 (1999) (detailing a more nuanced view of the life of the man 
regarded by peers to be a sinister capitalist). 
 43. 35 Stat. 546 (1908), repealed by Technical Amendments to the Federal Banking 
Laws, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2292, 2294 (1994). 
 44. RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN 129-30 (1990). 
 45. G. EDWARD GRIFFIN, THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND 7-8 (1994). 
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sponsor of the Glass-Steagall Act—brokered a compromise on behalf of 
the Woodrow Wilson administration.46  That compromise adopted the 
concept of regional Federal Reserve banks that would be owned and 
controlled by private member banks and—as Wilson and Glass insisted—
supervised by an oversight board controlled and appointed by the 
government in Washington:  the Federal Reserve Board.47  With that 
compromise, Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act in 1913.48
D. The Pujo Committee 
 
 An investigation performed by the House Committee on Banking 
and Currency, which began in 1912 and was headed by Arsene Pujo from 
Louisiana, looked for, and found, a “money trust,” composed of an 
interlocking web of directorships among banks and large industrial 
enterprises.49  The Pujo Committee also renewed concerns with the 
securities affiliates created by the large banks like the National City Co.  
The Committee believed that the banks were using their affiliates to evade 
regulatory restrictions on bank securities activities, which of course, they 
were.50
E. The Stock Market Crash of 1929 
  Nothing came of that criticism, however, at least until the passage 
of the Glass-Steagall Act. 
 The securities affiliates of the large banks provided a mechanism for 
the banks to participate in the stock market run-up that occurred at the end 
of the 1920s.  The National City Co. and the securities affiliate of Chase 
National Bank (now JPMorgan Chase), in addition to other such affiliates, 
were underwriting securities offerings and operating retail brokerage 
operations.  Those bank affiliates were handling about one-half of all 
securities underwritings before the 1929 crash.51
 
 46. Carter Glass cut a wide swath in banking history.  He was a newspaper publisher in 
Virginia before being elected to the House of Representatives in 1902 where he served as 
head of the Banking Committee from 1914-1918.  From 1918 to 1920, Glass served as the 
Secretary of the Treasury.  He was elected to the Senate in 1920 and served there for the 
next twenty-six years.  1 ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE (1913-
1951) 67 n.4 (1989). 
  The National City Co. 
had offices in fifty-eight cities and employed a private wire system 11,000 
 47. CHERNOW, supra note 44, at 129-30. 
 48. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913). 
 49. H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593, pt. 3, ch. 3, at 129-30 (1913). 
 50. Id. at 173. 
 51. Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The 
Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 692 
(1987) (citing S. KENNEDY, THE BANKING CRISIS OF 1933, at 212 (1973)). 
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miles in length.  It underwrote over twenty percent of all the bond offerings 
in the United States during the 1920s, it was a significant underwriter for 
municipal and state governments, and it acted as underwriter in over 150 
foreign bond issues between 1921 and 1929.  In total, National City Co. 
underwrote stock valued at $6 billion in the five-year period preceding the 
stock market crash.52
 The National City Co. was headed by Charles Mitchell, who became 
infamous for his encouragement that national securities should sell 
campaigns that utilized high-pressure sales tactics to induce purchases from 
often unsophisticated investors.  As one author noted, Mitchell “was 
nicknamed ‘Sunshine Charlie’ for his infectious optimism.  He was the 
carnival salesman of American Banking, who had transformed his firm into 
a giant machine for selling stocks.”
 
53  Some of the stock and bond sales by 
the National City Co. turned out to be disastrous for investors.  Of 
particular concern was a series of Republic of Peru bonds, which totaled 
$90 million.  National City Co. made no effort to determine whether Peru 
would be able to service the bonds, and the bonds soon went into default.  
Investors bought the bonds for $90, but they were trading at less than $5 
after the Stock Market Crash of 1929.54
 Charles Mitchell raised more concerns after he became the head of 
the National City Bank.  He began a program of promoting the bank’s 
stock through the National City Co. and engaged in speculative trading of 
National City Bank’s own stock, driving its cost up from $20 to $580 per 
share.
 
55  Since he was president of the National City Bank, Mitchell had the 
opportunity to serve as a director of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
in 1929.  Ignoring the obligations of that office, Mitchell defied the Federal 
Reserve Board’s effort to cool the stock market by raising interest rates in 
the “call” money market that financed speculative margin trading.  Mitchell 
announced, in response to the Fed’s effort to cool speculation, that the 
National City Bank would inject $25 million into the call market.  He 
hoped that this action would drive interest rates down and make increasing 
amounts of funds available in the stock market, which would ensure the 
market’s continuing liquidity.56
 
 52. MARKHAM, supra note 34, at 116. 
 
 53. LIAQUAT AHAMED, LORDS OF FINANCE: THE BANKERS WHO BROKE THE WORLD 312 
(2009). 
 54. Jerry Duggan, Regulation FD: SEC Tells Corporate Insiders to “Chill Out”, 7 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 159, 165 n.24 (2001) (citation omitted) (noting that this was one of 
the largest scams responsible for the downfall of the market). 
 55. MARKHAM, supra note 34, at 117. 
 56. AHAMED, supra note 53, at 323.  In fairness to Mitchell, the Federal Reserve 
System was in a state of disarray because of policy differences between the Federal Reserve 
Board in Washington and the New York Federal Reserve Bank.  In addition, a small cabal 
of individuals guided policy at central banks in the U.S. (Benjamin Strong), England 
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 The activities of the National City Bank and Charles Mitchell 
caught the eye of Senator Carter Glass.  As Professor Donald Langervoort 
has observed: 
Glass was extremely troubled during the later 1920s by extensive 
bank lending to finance securities purchases, not because he was 
opposed to the stock market itself, but because he believed that 
such lending was taking money away from local businesses in 
need of credit. He sought to use his influence to pressure the 
Federal Reserve and the bankers to adopt policies of restraint on 
brokers’ call loans and margin lending, but he was not successful. 
Research under his direction a few years later uncovered perhaps 
the most significant statistic leading to eventual passage of the 
legislation—by 1930, some forty-one percent of all commercial 
bank assets were invested in securities or securities-related loans. 
It was during this period that Glass formed a negative view of 
bank securities affiliates, which he considered a major source of 
the temptation to divert bank funds away from commercial uses.  
Indeed, he took personal offense at the deliberate and pointed 
failure of the officers of the largest banks with such affiliates 
(particularly Charles Mitchell of National City Bank) to adopt a 
program of voluntary restraint with respect to brokers’ call 
loans.57
 The horrors of the Great Depression need not be recounted here; it is 
sufficient to say that the nation was broken economically and the banking 
system was wrecked.
 
58  Over 1,300 banks failed in 1930.  Another 2,000 
banks failed in 1931.  By 1932, twenty-five percent of all banks in the 
United States had failed.59  The Federal Reserve Board played no 
meaningful role in preventing the Great Depression and actually did much 
to prolong it.60
 
(Montagu Norman) France (Emile Moreau), and Germany (Hjalmar Schacht), but they were 
often at cross-purposes and, if anything, worsened the crisis that arose in the 1930s.  Id., 
passim. 
  “Ironically, the very existence of the Federal Reserve 
 57. Langevoort, supra note 51, at 694 (footnotes omitted). 
 58. See T.H. WATKINS, THE GREAT DEPRESSION (1993) (describing those hardships).  
As another author described the worldwide effects of the Great Depression: 
[R]eal GDP in the major economies fell by over 25 percent, a quarter of the 
adult male population was thrown out of work, commodity prices fell in half, 
consumer prices declined by 30 percent, wages were cut by a third.  Bank credit 
in the United States shrank by 40 percent and in many countries the whole 
banking system collapsed. Almost every major sovereign debtor among 
developing countries and in Central and Eastern Europe defaulted, including 
Germany, the third largest economy in the world. 
AHAMED, supra note 53, at 497. 
 59. MARKHAM, supra note 34, at 161. 
 60. As noted by Ben Bernanke before he became chairman of the Federal Reserve:  
“The monetary policy of the 30’s led to a deflation which created, among other things, the 
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System seemed to relieve the big private banks like the House of Morgan 
from playing the liquefying role they had assumed in earlier panics, such as 
1907.”61
F. The Glass-Steagall Act 
 
 The banking panic was still underway when Franklin D. Roosevelt 
assumed office.  He declared a bank holiday immediately after being 
inaugurated, closing the banks until they could be examined for solvency.  
In order to restore confidence in the banking system, his administration 
created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), which 
insured bank deposits from the risk of insolvency.62  This created a moral 
hazard that would be realized in future years,63
 Congress was also concerned with the mortgage lending activities of 
national banks.  The McFadden Act, which it had passed in 1927, had 
allowed national banks to make residential mortgage loans.  The national 
banks then expanded their mortgage activity “dramatically.”
 but it did restore faith in the 
banking system and many banks were able to reopen as a result. 
64  That 
increase in activity raised concerns in Congress that “an immense 
overexpansion of real-estate values [had been] set in motion” and that 
many banks were “hopelessly embarrassed by their real-estate 
commitments and by the fact that rents and selling values [had] so seriously 
shrunk.”65  To address those concerns, a provision was included in the 
Banking Act of 1933 that required the Federal Reserve banks to ascertain 
whether banks were unduly using depositor’s funds in “speculative 
carrying of or trading in . . . real estate.”66
 
greatly increased value of debts, which[,] therefore[,] led to more defaults and 
bankruptcies.”  WESSEL, supra note 6, at 42 (citation omitted). 
  The Fed’s power to examine 
bank speculative activity in real estate did nothing to prevent the subprime 
crisis. 
 61. DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION 
AND WAR (1929-1945) 69 (1999). 
 62. Nicholas Economides, R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, The Political Economy of 
Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition 
Among Small and Large Banks, 39 J.L. & ECON. 667, 697 (1996) [hereinafter Branching 
Restrictions].  That insurance initially covered amounts up to $2,500 and was increased to 
$5,000 in 1935.  Id. at 698.  FDIC insurance was increased from $100,000 per depositor to 
$250,000 during the subprime crisis in 2008.  David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Approves 
Measure to Reduce Home Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2009, at A4. 
 63. Banking Restrictions, supra note 62, at 697-98. 
 64. John A. Deangelis, Riches Do Not Last Forever: Real Estate Investment by 
National Banks, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 777, 783 (1991). 
 65. S. REP. NO. 73-77, at 7 (1933). 
 66. 12 U.S.C. §301 (2006). 
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III. THE RISE AND FALL OF GLASS-STEAGALL 
A. Why Glass-Steagall? 
 The Glass-Steagall Act of 193367 sought the “complete 
divorcement” of commercial and investment banking68 by prohibiting 
commercial banks from engaging in the “issue, flotation, underwriting, 
public sale or distribution either wholesale, or retail or through a syndicate 
participation, of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or other securities.”69  It is 
unclear from its legislative history why Congress mandated this divorce.70
When called upon to interpret the Glass-Steagall Act, judges 
“face a virtually insurmountable burden due to the vast 
dichotomy between the ostensible legislative intent and the actual 
motivations of Congress.”  Divining the aim of Congress . . . is 
particularly formidable because the issue of the proper 
relationship between commercial banks and their affiliates caused 
considerable disagreement among legislators and experts who 
participated in the development of what became the Banking Act 
of 1933.
  
As one court noted: 
71
 There is little factual basis for concluding that the securities 
affiliates were a particular danger to banks.  A study of nearly three 
 
 
 67. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended 
at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 68. S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 185 (1934) (Conf. Rep.). 
 69. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., THE SECURITY MARKETS 84 (1935). 
 70. JIM POWELL, FDR’S FOLLY: HOW ROOSEVELT AND HIS NEW DEAL PROLONGED THE 
GREAT DEPRESSION 57-64 (2003). 
 71. Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47, 56 (2d 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).  A comment published in the Harvard Law 
Review in 1934 asserted that the Glass-Steagall Act sought “to achieve integrity of the 
system within itself by forcing bankers to withdraw from conflicting affiliations and by 
assuring them of a fair return, conservatively earned, in their own field.”  Legislation: The 
Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933, 47 HARV. L. REV. 325, 326 (1933-1934).  Numerous 
scholarly articles have been written on this issue.  See Edmond M. Ianni, “Security” Under 
the Glass-Steagall Act and the Federal Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934: The Direction of 
the Supreme Court’s Analysis, 100 BANKING L. J. 100, 103-05 (1983) (discussing the 
perceived policy grounds behind the Glass-Steagall Act); Roberta Karmel, Glass-Steagall: 
Some Critical Reflections, 97 BANKING L. J. 631 (1980) (same); Casey K. McGarvey, 
Federal Regulation of Bank Securities Activities: Will Congress Allow Glass-Steagall to be 
Shattered? 12 J. CONTEMP. L. 99, 101-05 (1986) (same); Lawrence F. Orbe III, Glass-
Steagall: Lest We Forget, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 163 (1983-1984) (same); Note, A Conduct-
Oriented Approach to the Glass-Steagall Act, 91 YALE L.J. 102, 103-06 (1981) (same); 
Note, Bankers Trust II:  Underwriting, Commercial Paper Placement, and the Risk of Loss 
Under the Glass-Steagall Act, 76 KY. L.J. 497, 504-507 (1987-1988) (same); Note, 
Commercial Bank Private Placement Activity: Cracking Glass-Steagall, 27 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 743, 747-50 (1977-1978) (same). 
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thousand banks that failed between 1865 and 1936 concluded that 
securities activities were not even among the top seven reasons for their 
failures.72  A Fed official also testified during the Glass-Steagall hearings 
that, while there had been abuses with the bank affiliates, the Board did not 
advocate prohibiting banks from having securities affiliates.73  Claims were 
also made that the securities underwritten by bank affiliates were of poor 
quality, but studies have shown that their underwritings were actually of 
higher quality than those of the investment banks.74  The Glass-Steagall 
Act’s “legislative history reflects the notion that the underlying cause of the 
stock market crash in 1929 and subsequent bank solvencies came about 
from the excessive use of bank credit to speculate in the stock market.”75  
However, that was an issue to be addressed at the bank level, not the 
securities affiliate level.  To remedy that perceived problem, the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 gave the Federal Reserve Board the power to control 
bank lending on margin for stocks.76
 Some think that the Glass-Steagall Act’s prohibition on stock 
underwriting was prompted by the failure of the Bank of United States (a 
New York bank) and its security affiliate, the City Financial Corporation.  
Bernard K. Marcus and Saul Singer, the two most senior officials at the 
bank, were indicted and convicted of fraudulent banking practices.  The 
securities affiliate was not shown to have caused the bank’s failure.  
Rather, the bank’s worst losses were due to its exposure to New York City 
real estate properties, which had plunged in value as the Great Depression 
began (half of the bank’s loan portfolio was devoted to real estate 
finance).
 
77  Bank of United States also eventually returned 83.3 cents on 
each depositor’s dollar during its liquidation, not a bad result during the 
world’s greatest depression.78
 The actual reason for the Glass-Steagall Act proscriptions on 
investment banking appears to be the concern on the part of the Act’s 
principal sponsor, Senator Glass, that the Federal Reserve Board had 
 
 
 72. MARKHAM, supra note 34, at 168. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Randall S. Kroszner & Raghuram G. Rajan, Is the Glass-Steagall Act Justified? 
A Study of the U.S. Experience With Universal Banking Before 1933, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 
810 (1994) (proposing that public awareness of the conflict of interest constrained 
commercial banks’ opportunities for moral hazard). 
 75. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 839 F.2d at 57. 
 76. 15 U.S.C. § 78(g) (2006).  The Fed has adopted various regulations limiting credit 
extensions on stocks.  For example, banks are limited under Regulation T to loans of fifty 
percent of stock value.  For the history and background of this legislation, see Jerry W. 
Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin in the Commodity Futures Industry—History and 
Theory, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 59, 101-05 (1991). 
 77. AHAMED, supra note 53, at 386. 
 78. See JAMES GRANT, MONEY OF THE MIND: BORROWING AND LENDING IN AMERICA 
FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO MICHAEL MILKEN 203-10 (1992) (describing this failure). 
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created a speculative “investment banking system.”79  Glass had played a 
key role in the legislation that created the Federal Reserve in 1913, and he 
long feared that banks that were members of the Fed would use their 
borrowings from the Fed for “stock market speculative operations” if they 
could also act as investment bankers.80
I am objecting to affiliates altogether. I am objecting to a national 
banking institution setting up a back-door arrangement by which 
it may engage in a business which the national bank act denies it 
the privilege of doing. If investment banking is a profitable 
business, who does not know that such business will be set up as 
a separate institution, not using the money and prestige and 
facilities of a national bank and its deposits to engage in 
investment activities? I want to make it impossible hereafter to 
have the portfolios of commercial banks filled with useless 
speculative securities, so that when stringency comes upon the 
country these banks may not respond to the requirements of 
commerce. That is what is the matter with the country today, and 
it is because this bill would avert a repetition of that disaster that 
intense and bitter opposition has been organized against it.
  Relevant to concerns over bank 
activities during the subprime crisis, Senator Glass asserted that: 
81
 “Senator Glass’ aspiration to divorce completely commercial banks 
from their security affiliates was not attained” because the statute as 
enacted contained a number of exceptions for bank affiliate securities 
activities.
 
82  The banks would exploit those loopholes in the coming 
decades in order to compete with the securities industry.  This touched off a 
long running war with the securities industry, which, as one prominent 
scholar concluded, used the Glass-Steagall Act as a barrier to protect its 
investment bankers from competition from commercial banks.83
 
 79. R. Nicholas Rodelli, The New Operating Standards for Section 20 Subsidiaries: The 
Federal Reserve Board’s Prudent March Toward Financial Services Modernization, 2 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 311, 313 n.17 (1998). 
 In any 
 80. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 839 F.2d at 57.  A biography of Senator Glass that was published 
in 1939 fails to provide any elucidation on this issue.  RIXEY SMITH & NORMAN BEASLEY, 
CARTER GLASS: A BIOGRAPHY (1939).  Glass was a long-time critic of speculation on the 
New York Stock Exchange, but was conflicted on the issue of whether increased interest 
rates should be used to curb speculation.  He knew that increased rates would cause a drop 
in the value of bonds, which would hurt bondholders, including those holding government 
bonds.  Glass did believe strongly that the facilities of the Fed should not be made available 
for loans to speculators, who had appeared after World War I in large numbers.  Id. at 182-
84. 
 81. 76 CONG. REC. 2000 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1933) (statement of Sen. Glass) (emphasis 
added). 
 82. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 839 F.2d at 59. 
 83. See Jonathan Macy, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function:  
The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1, 2 (1984) (“[T]he actual motive behind the 
passage of the Act can only have been that of protecting one group—investment bankers—
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event, the Glass-Steagall Act ultimately proved a disappointment to 
everyone, including Carter Glass who sought a repeal of its provisions a 
year after its enactment.84
 The Glass-Steagall Act sought to create a less complicated banking 
system than the universal bank model employed in Europe, a simplification 
that was aided by the Fed’s regulation of interest rates through Regulation 
Q.  Under this regime, bankers benefited from the so-called “3-6-3” rule—
banks borrowed money at the Regulation Q interest rate of 3 percent, 
loaned money at 6 percent, and (having nothing else to do) played golf at 
three o’clock.
 
85  In the 1960s, however, inflation began squeezing the 
banks’ ability to profit, and they began expanding and crossing regulatory 
boundaries in order to staunch the bleeding.  Rather than opposing such 
attempts, Comptroller of the Currency James J. Saxon encouraged them, 
taking an expansive view of the banking laws.86  “Saxon substantially 
changed the agency by expanding its legal and economic staffs, 
undertaking a program to expand bank powers, and welcoming new banks 
and branches into the national banking system in contrast to the more 
restrictive practices of his immediate predecessors.”87
 Saxon’s rulings allowing banks to intrude into other areas of 
commerce were occasionally subjected to legal challenges, and some of 




at the expense of another—commercial bankers.”). 
  Nevertheless, his successors in the 
OCC continued to interpret banking laws in ways that allowed banks to 
 84. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANKING FINANCIAL 
SERVICE ACTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS, 722 (3d ed. 2008). 
 85. Banks sometimes avoided Regulation Q ceilings by offering advertising premiums 
for new businesses and by offering toasters and other giveaways to attract depositors.  
HERBERT V. PROCHNOW & HERBERT V. PROCHNOW, JR., THE CHANGING WORLD OF BANKING 
60 (1974).  Regulation Q rates were repealed in order to allow banks to attract deposits at 
market rates.  This led to rate competition and the growth of deposit brokers that placed 
funds with banks offering the highest rates.  This was “hot money” that could be easily 
moved out of the banks, sometimes leading to what amounted to a run on a bank.  This led 
to the imposition of restrictions allowing only “well-capitalized” banks to accept brokered 
deposits.  More recently, in the wake of the subprime crisis, the FDIC has proposed to 
restrict the amount of interest that banks that are not well-capitalized can pay for deposits.  
Matthias Rieker, For Banks, Rate Rules Could Mean Tough Times, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 
2009, at C1. 
 86. Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 221, 240 (2000). 
 87. Comptroller of the Currency, Administrator of National Banks, James J. Saxon:  
Controller of the Currency, 1961-1966, http://www.occ.treas.gov/saxon.htm (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2010). 
 88. See, e.g., Saxon v. Ga. Ass’n of Indep. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968) 
(overturning the Comptroller’s 1962 ruling that national banks could properly act as 
insurance agents); see also Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970) (overturning the 
Comptroller’s ruling that national banks could properly provide travel services to customers 
because such services were incidental to the business of banking). 
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expand into areas that competed with other financial services firms.89  The 
securities industry, which the investment bankers and their allies 
dominated, challenged a number of the expanded commercial bank 
activities authorized by the OCC.90  In 1971, for example, the Supreme 
Court held in Investment Company Institute v. Camp that the operation by 
commercial banks of a commingled investment account violated the Glass-
Steagall Act because it operated like a mutual fund.91  The Supreme Court 
rolled out a litany of horrors, which it termed “subtle hazards,” that could 
arise if banks were allowed to engage in such activity.92  Banks did 
subsequently operate mutual funds without such horrors arising. 
 Ten years after the Camp decision, the Supreme Court held, in 
Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System v. Investment Co. 
Institute,93 that the Fed could properly allow bank holding companies to 
advise closed-end investment companies concerning their investments 
because such advice did not involve the sale or distribution of securities by 
the bank.94  In 1984, the Supreme Court held in Securities Industry 
Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board 
 
 89. George G. Kaufman and Larry R. Mote, Glass-Steagall: Repeal by Regulatory and 
Judicial Reinterpretation, 107 BANKING L. J. 388 (1993). 
that 
commercial banks could not market commercial paper because it was a 
 90. See generally Securities Industry Ass’n, Public Policy Issues Raised by Bank 
Securities Activities, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 339 (1982-1983) (describing securities industry 
views on bank securities activities). 
 91. 401 U.S. 617, 629 (1971). 
 92. Id. at 630.  The Court stated that: 
The bank’s stake in the investment fund might distort its credit decisions or lead 
to unsound loans to the companies in which the fund had invested. The bank 
might exploit its confidential relationship with its commercial and industrial 
creditors for the benefit of the fund. The bank might undertake, directly or 
indirectly, to make its credit facilities available to the fund or to render other aid 
to the fund inconsistent with the best interests of the bank’s depositors. The 
bank might make loans to facilitate the purchase of interests in the fund. The 
bank might divert talent and resources from its commercial banking operation to 
the promotion of the fund.  Moreover, because the bank would have a stake in a 
customer’s making a particular investment decision—the decision to invest in 
the bank's investment fund—the customer might doubt the motivation behind 
the bank’s recommendation that he make such an investment. If the fund 
investment should turn out badly there would be a danger that the bank would 
lose the good will of those customers who had invested in the fund. It might be 
unlikely that disenchantment would go so far as to threaten the solvency of the 
bank. But because banks are dependent on the confidence of their customers, 
the risk would not be unreal. 
Id. at 637-38. 
 93. 450 U.S. 46, 71 (1981). 
 94. For a discussion of the inroads by banks into the securities business in the 1980s, 
see Thomas G. Fischer et al., The Securities Activities of Commercial Banks: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis, 51 TENN. L. REV. 467 (1984). 
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security under the Glass-Steagall Act.95  However, that was a temporary 
setback because the District of Columbia Circuit Court subsequently held 
that a bank could distribute commercial paper on an agency basis, 
notwithstanding the prohibitions of the Glass-Steagall Act.96
 Banking regulators concluded that banks could broker other 
securities for customers without falling afoul of the Glass-Steagall 
prohibitions against underwriting and dealing in stocks.
 
97  The Supreme 
Court upheld the Federal Reserve’s approval of Bank America 
Corporation’s acquisition of Charles Schwab in Securities Industry 
Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.98  
Charles Schwab was a discount broker that only acted as a broker, but its 
nationwide operations opened the door for BankAmerica to participate 
broadly in the securities markets, thus encouraging several more banks to 
enter joint ventures with discount brokers.99
 Another loophole soon opened up further intrusion by the banks into 
the securities industry.  Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act allowed 
commercial banks to underwrite certain government securities called 
“bank-eligible” securities—a category that included state and municipal 
securities—and it permitted dealings in U.S. government and agency 
securities.
 
100  Banks also used section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act to 
circumvent that Act’s restrictions on underwriting.  By its terms, section 20 
prohibited banks from affiliating with companies “engaged principally” in 
the “issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale or distribution” of “bank-
ineligible” securities like stock and corporate debt.101
 
 95. 468 U.S. 137, 139-40 (1984). 
  In 1988, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Fed’s determination that a security 
affiliate is principally engaged in bank-ineligible securities activities only 
when those activities exceeded five to ten percent of the affiliate’s gross 
 96. Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Gov. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).  Ironically, commercial paper was largely exempt 
from regulation as a security under the federal securities laws.  Sanders v. John Nuveen & 
Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972). 
 97. The Comptroller of the Currency determined in 1982 that the Security Pacific 
National Bank could operate a discount brokerage subsidiary.  2 JANE W. D’ARISTA, THE 
EVOLUTION OF U.S. FINANCE, RESTRUCTURING INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS 311 (1994).  The 
Fed also ruled that discount brokerage services did not run afoul of the Bank Holding 
Company Act because, according to the Fed, they were closely related to bank activities.  Id. 
at 77. 
 98. 468 U.S. 207, 221 (1984). 
 99. BankAmerica bought Schwab for $55 million in 1983 and resold it to Schwab 
management in 1987 for $280 million.  Charles Schwab Corporation, About Schwab: 
History, http://www.aboutschwab.com/about/history/index.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
 100. Banking Act of 1933, Ch. 89, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 16, 48 Stat. 162, 184-85 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 227 (1988)). 
 101. § 20, 48 Stat. at 189. 
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revenue.102  That limit was increased to twenty-five percent in 1996, 
allowing some giant banks to acquire and operate some rather large broker-
dealers.103
 The SEC eventually became concerned about the banks’ increased 
participation in the securities market.  For this reason, it adopted a rule 
requiring
 
 banks engaging in the securities brokerage business to register 
with the SEC as broker-dealers.  The District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals held that the SEC lacked the power to enact such a rule,104 but the 
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 imposed a one-year moratorium 
on further approvals by the Fed for additional bank securities activities.105
B. Banking Intrusions 
  
That only temporarily slowed the intrusion of the banks into the securities 
arena. 
 The Bank Holding Company Act prohibited bank holding 
companies from diversifying into non-traditional bank business without the 
Fed’s approval.106  That statute proscribed bank holding companies from 
holding shares of another company unless the Fed found the activities of 
such a company “to be so closely related to banking as to be a proper 
incident thereto.”107  Exempted from that provision were one-bank holding 
companies108—which became a popular way to avoid restrictions imposed 
on banks—until Congress eliminated that exception with the Bank Holding 
Company Act Amendments of 1970.109  The amendments did, however, 
grandfather existing one-bank holding companies.110
 
 102. Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Gov. of the Federal Res. Sys., 839 F.2d 47, 68-69 (2d 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988). 
  Reverse competition 
came in the form of non-bank banks. A non-bank bank did not meet the 
definition of a bank because they did not both accept deposits and make 
 103. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 84, at 719.  A federal court also ruled in 1987 
that the National Westminster Bank PLC and its subsidiary, NatWest Holdings, Inc., could 
provide investment advice and securities brokerage services to institutional customers 
without violating Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act.  Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Gov. of 
the Federal Res. Sys., 821 F.2d 810, 819-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 
(1988). 
 104. Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 804 F.2d 739, 755-56 (D.C. Cir. 
1986). 
 105. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 509(a), 101 Stat. 
552, 635 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.). 
 106. D’ARISTA, supra note 97, at 69. 
 107. 12 U.S.C. §1843(c)(8) (2006). 
 108. Id. § 1843(d). 
 109. Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1850, 1971-78 (2006)); 
see also CHRISTOPHER ELIAS, THE DOLLAR BARRONS 162 (1973) (narrating the effect of the 
“loophole” on the banking industry and the story of its eventual removal). 
 110. § 2(5), 84 Stat. at 1761. 
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loans.111
 The 1990s witnessed a series of other actions by regulators that 
further diminished the line between commercial and investment banking.  
The Bank Service Corporation Act permitted banks to operate bank service 
corporations that could perform back office services for banks and certain 
other activities.
 
112  The Comptroller adopted regulations in 1997 that 
permitted national banks to establish “operating subsidiaries” to engage in 
activities that a national bank could not engage in directly, including some 
insurance activities.113  The Comptroller also allowed NationsBank to 
operate a subsidiary to develop residential condominiums.114
 Several rulings by the Comptroller of the Currency and the Supreme 
Court permitted national banks to enter the insurance and annuities 
market.
 
115  Prior to these rulings, only certain state-chartered banks had 
been permitted to provide insurance services.  The Garn-St. Germain 
Depository Institutions Act of 1982116 sought to prohibit federal bank 
regulators from further expanding the powers of banks into underwriting 
insurance as an activity that is “integrally related to traditional bank 
functions.”117
 
 111. Several stock brokerage firms, including Merrill Lynch, operated non-banks, but 
Congress acted to curb such activities for non-bank banks not yet in existence through the 
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987.  Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552.  However, 
those curbs did not stop non-bank banks from generating the subprime loans that were at the 
center of the subprime crisis.  These entities did not accept deposits.  Rather, they financed 
their mortgage lending through borrowings from a Wall Street firm, and then securitized the 
mortgages through a “warehousing” operation with the investment bank.  See PAUL MUOLO 
& MATHEW PADILLA, CHAIN OF BLAME (2008) (describing this process). 
  This precluded the Fed from authorizing bank holding 
companies to engage in or be affiliated with companies that were 
 The Competitive Equality Banking Act also allowed “industrial loan” companies to 
continue to operate. These companies could make loans as an adjunct to their sales of goods. 
12 U.S.C. §1841(c)(2)(H).  Target and Nordstrom were among the companies using this 
exemption.  Eric Lipton, Citing Risks, U.S. Seeks New Rules For Niche Banks, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 17, 2009, at A1.  The Obama administration has claimed that these entities pose a 
systemic risk and is seeking their regulation.  Id. 
 112. John D. Douglas, Technology and Banking, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 59, 66-67 (1997). 
 113. J. Virgil Mattingly & Keiran J. Fallon, Understanding the Issues Raised by 
Financial Modernization, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 25, 57 (1998); Note, Functional Regulation 
of Bank Insurance Activities: The Time Has Come, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 455, 468 (1998). 
 114. 3 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE 
AGE OF DERIVATIVES INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM (1970-2001) 241 (2002) [hereinafter 
MARKHAM II]. 
 115. See generally Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: 
Before and After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 J. CORP. L. 723 (2000) (tracing the 
development of the banking industry, the insurance industry, and the regulations causing 
both their separation and overlap). 
 116. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469. 
 117. Mattingly & Fallon, supra note 113, at 46 (describing the difficulty in resolving 
what specific functions should be exempted). 
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underwriting insurance, although the act grandfathered activities that had 
already been approved. 
 Before that legislation was enacted, the OCC had allowed banks to 
offer credit life insurance because it was an activity that was closely related 
to banking, and that action was upheld by the District of Columbia 
Circuit.118  Even after Garn-St. Germain, however, the OCC ruled that sales 
of credit insurance, municipal bond insurance, disability insurance and title 
insurance were incidental to the business of banking.119  The Comptroller 
also approved an application by BancOne that allowed it to operate a 
subsidiary that planned to engage in reinsurance, which has the same effect 
as underwriting.120  In 1995, the Supreme Court held that national banks 
could sell annuities.121  One year later the Court ruled in Barnett Bank of 
Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson that the states could not enact legislation 
that would prevent national banks from participating in the insurance 
business.122
 The Comptroller of the Currency had also ruled, in 1963, that 
national banks could sell insurance anywhere in the United States, as long 
as the sales were made from a bank or branch that was located in a town 
with a population of less than 5,000.
 
123  This action was taken under a 
statute that many people thought had been repealed in 1918.124  The section 
was even omitted from the official United States Code compilation in 1952, 
but in 1993 the Supreme Court held that the provision was still in effect.125  
After that decision, the OCC allowed banks to create operating subsidiaries 
that would operate a general insurance agency from a place with a 
population of 5,000 or less and use the nationwide branches of the bank for 
referrals.126
 
 118. Indep. Bankers Ass’n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  
The OCC extended that ruling to crop insurance, but the D.C. Circuit ruled that the OCC 
had then gone too far, although noting that the newly enacted Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
might permit such activity.  Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Hawke, 211 F.3d 638, 645-46 
(D.C. Cir. 2000). 
  The result of these inroads into the insurance industry was that 
some seventy percent of banks were offering some form of insurance 
 119. Leigh Rabemacher, Powers of National Banks to Sell Insurance, Annuities and 
Securities from Bank Premises, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 753, 754 (1997) (citations omitted). 
 120. MARKHAM II, supra note 114, at 241. 
 121. NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 264 (1995). 
 122. 517 U.S. 25, 43 (1996). 
 123. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 124. Pub. L. No. 64-270, ch. 461, 39 Stat. 752, 753-54 (1916); see also David W. 
Roderer, Nonexistent Banking Law Warrants Close Scrutiny, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 19, 1984, at 
12 (describing this incident). 
 125. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439, 463 (1993). 
 126. O.C.C. Interpretative Letter 753, to Robert L. Andersen, Esquire, Senior Vice 
President and Assistant Gen. Counsel (Nov. 4 1996), available at 1996 WL 655026. 
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product before enactment of the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act.127  Banks were 
then accounting for over twenty-five percent of annuity sales.128
 Despite the Supreme Court’s decision in Investment Company 
Institute v. Camp,
 
129 by 1993 banks had also become one of the largest 
sellers of mutual funds,130 a product regulated by the SEC under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940.131  Commercial banks in the 1990s 
could sell mutual funds directly to customers as agents or establish separate 
broker affiliates for brokering mutual fund shares.  Banks could 
additionally provide investment advisory services to their customers with 
respect to mutual funds.  Banks offered “private label” mutual funds as 
well as those of other organizations.132
 Sixteen firms were operating mutual funds for banks in order to 
avoid Glass-Steagall prohibitions on bank underwriting activities.  One 
such firm, Concord Holding Corp., was administering and distributing over 
$36 billion worth of mutual funds for banks in 1993.  By then, one-third of 
all mutual funds were being sold through banks.
 
133  Mellon Bank acquired 
the Dreyfus mutual fund complex in 1993 and became the largest bank 
manager of mutual funds, as well as the second largest asset manager in the 
United States.  NationsBank Corp (now Bank of America) was selling 
some forty different mutual funds.  Citibank was also selling a family of 
mutual funds.134
C. Financial Supermarkets 
 
 In approving a request by Chase Manhattan Bank to act as principal 
in a “commodity price index swap” with its customers, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency noted in 1987 that: 
The “business of banking” has changed drastically over the 124 
years since the National Bank Act was enacted to support a 
national currency, and no one expects banks today to be restricted 
to the practices that then constituted the “business of banking.” 
The adaptability of the national banking system will become 
 
 127. CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION: UNDERSTANDING THE 
CHANGING ROLE OF BANKS, MUTUAL FUNDS, AND INSURANCE COMPANIES 85 (1997). 
 128. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 84, at 879. 
 129. 401 U.S. 617, 625 (1971) (finding that investment fund operation violated the 
Glass-Steagall prohibition on issuance, sale, and distribution of securities). 
 130. See Penny Lunt, How Are Mutual Funds Changing Banks?, A.B.A. BANKING J., 
June 1993, at 31 (quoting James Shelton’s statement that “[b]anks will soon become the 
major source of distribution for mutual fund products”). 
 131. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 80a-
1 et seq. (2006)). 
 132. MARKHAM II, supra note 114, at 239. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 239-40. 
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increasingly important as advances in technology and 
telecommunications accelerate the rate of change.135
The Comptroller’s Office adopted a statement by a court in which it was 
asserted:  “[W]e believe the powers of national banks must be construed so 




 Before the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, commercial 
banks were “selling stocks and bonds, providing advice on mergers and 
acquisitions, concocting new fangled financial products[,] and trading.”
  The result was to turn banks into financial supermarkets. 
137  
Banks were underwriting and distributing loans and bonds, providing 
mezzanine financing to companies, engaging in foreign exchange trading in 
the interbank currency market, advising customers on mergers and 
acquisitions, and offering complex financial instruments.138  Banks were 
acting as agents in private placements, sponsoring closed-end investment 
funds and offering deposit accounts with returns that were tied to stock 
market performance.139  Other bank and bank affiliate activities included 
euro dollar dealings, trust investments, automatic investment services, 
dividend investment services, dealing in swaps and other OTC derivatives 
and providing research services.140
 Before GLBA, many of the larger banks were receiving from one-
third to over half of their revenues from non-interest income.  Some of the 
activities that the banking regulators found to be closely related to banking 
included:  acting as an investment advisor; leasing personal or real 
property; acting as underwriter for credit life insurance and credit accident 
and health insurance related to an extension of credit; performing 
appraisals of real estate; arranging commercial real estate equity financing; 
providing individual retirement accounts and cash management services; 
providing tax planning and preparation services; operating an agency for 
 
 
 135. Id. at 140 (quoting Letter from OCC, to Margery Waxman, Sidley & Austin (July 
23, 1987)). 
 136. Id. (quoting Letter from OCC, to Margery Waxman, Sidley & Austin (July 23, 
1987) (quoting M & M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat’l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th 
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978)). 
 137. Timothy L. O’Brien, Chase’s Global Pit Boss: Executive Leads Bank into High-
Stakes Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1998, at D1. 
 138. Markham, supra note 86, at 250-51 (citations omitted).  The banks were 
occasionally stymied by the courts in offering new products; see, e.g., Blackfeet Nat’l Bank 
v. Nelson, 171 F.3d 1237, 1244 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1004 (1999) (noting that 
banks could not underwrite retirement CDs). 
 139. Blackfeet Nat’l Bank, 171 F.3d at 1244. 
 140. Id.; see also MICHAEL G. CAPATIDES, A GUIDE TO CAPITAL MARKETS ACTIVITIES OF 
BANKS AND BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 185-86 (1993) (explaining these bank and bank 
affiliate activities); Jerry W. Markham & David J. Gilberg, Federal Regulation of Bank 
Activities In the Commodities Markets, 39 BUS. LAW. 1719, 1722 (1984) (describing such 
activities further). 
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collecting overdue accounts receivable; and operating a credit bureau.141
D. Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
 
 The banks thoroughly breached the barriers erected by Glass-
Steagall by the end of the 1990s.  Citicorp Inc. then administered the coup 
de grâce when it announced its merger with the Travelers Group, a major 
insurance underwriter, to form Citigroup.142  Commercial banks were still 
prohibited from owning insurance underwriting operations like those at 
Travelers, but the parties took advantage of a provision in the Bank 
Holding Company Act that granted a two-year period for a bank to divest 
itself of such operations when acquired, with a provision for three one-year 
extensions by the Fed.143
 Citigroup took a gamble, assuming that this merger would 
incentivize Congress to act in order to avoid breaking up the Travelers 
Group.  It worked.  The merger occurred on April 6, 1998 and the Glass-
Steagall Act was repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) on 
November 12, 1999.
 
144  Among other things, the GLBA removed insurance 
underwriting restrictions on commercial banks.145
 
 141. See MARKHAM II, supra note 114, at 238 (explaining the activities that led to 
revenues from non-interest income). 
  It also repealed section 
20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, thus allowing commercial banks to create 
“financial holding companies” and “financial subsidiaries.”  These entities 
can provide any number of services, as long as they are “financial in 
 142. For a description of the merger see CIT Group, Inc. v. Citicorp, 20 F. Supp. 2d 775, 
784 (D.N.J. 1998). 
 143. 12 U.S.C. §1842(a) (2006). 
 144. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. (113 
Stat.) 1338; see also Michael Schroeder, Congress Passes Financial Services Bill, WALL ST. 
J., Nov. 5, 1992, at A2 (“By stripping away restrictions in the Glass-Steagall financial-
services law—which prohibited the mixing of banking, securities and insurance activities—
the overhaul is a windfall for financial industries.”).  One critic of the GLBA asserted that 
Robert Rubin, while Secretary of the Treasury in the Clinton administration, shepherded 
GLBA through Congress for the benefit of Citigroup, where he became a senior executive 
after leaving the Treasury.  CHARLES GASPARINO, THE SELLOUT 190 (2007).  There is little 
doubt that the passage of GLBA was partially motivated by a desire to allow Citicorp to 
merge with the Travelers group of insurance companies, which had insurance underwriting 
operations that were prohibited by Glass-Steagall.  See Andrew Martin & Gretchen 
Morgenson, Can Citigroup Carry Its Own Weight?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, at BU1 (“In 
trying to right itself, Citigroup plans to undo much of what it did during a period some 
insiders call the lost decade—with events that included merging with Travelers Group in 
1998.”).  If GLBA had not been enacted, the renamed Citicorp would have had to sell those 
operations.  Ironically, Citicorp sold those underwriting operations anyway before the 
subprime crisis arose.  Eric Dash, MetLife to Buy Insurance Unit From Citigroup, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2005, at C1; Travelers Reports a Quarterly Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2002, 
at C8. 
 145. 12 U.S.C. §1843(k)(4)(B). 
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nature”—even when those services constitute investment banking.146  The 
banks underwriting operations were freed of the twenty-five percent 
limitation on revenue from bank ineligible activities.  The result was that 
within two years of the passage of GLBA, Citigroup surpassed Merrill 
Lynch as the nation’s largest underwriter of stocks and bonds.147
 The GLBA opened the door for commercial banks to enter other 
areas of finance, including, among other things, engaging freely in 
commercial paper dealings
 
148 and making limited merchant banking 
investments.149
E. The Subprime Crisis 
  The issue now to be considered is whether the repeal of 
Glass-Steagall by the GLBA somehow allowed the banks to engage in the 
activities that nearly destroyed them during the subprime crisis. 
 The subprime crisis was, without a doubt, one of the gravest 
financial crises in history.  Much of the blame for that crisis has been 
placed on the bursting of the residential real estate bubble, which was 
fueled in large part by the reckless expansion of subprime mortgage 
lending.  Those mortgages had been securitized and those offerings 
dropped sharply in value as the Federal Reserve Board drove up interest 
rates, causing massive losses at, among others, Citigroup, Wachovia, Bank 
of America, Washington Mutual, American International Group (“AIG”), 
Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Countrywide Financial, IndyMac, 
Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae.  Congress passed a $700 billion bailout 
package in October 2008, called the Troubled Asset Recovery Program 
(“TARP”), to inject capital into financial institutions, including $25 billion 
into Citigroup and $173 million at AIG.150
 
 146. See, e.g., Adam Nguyen & Matt Watkins, Financial Services Reform, 37 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 579, 579 (2000) (“An understanding of the significance of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act requires a brief examination of the inception of the Glass-Steagall Act and the 
BHCA.”); Paul J. Polking & Scott A. Cammarn, Overview of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 4 N.C 
BANKING INST. 1, 1 (2000) (“The Act makes sweeping changes to federal statutes governing 
the scope of permissible activities and the supervision of banks, bank holding companies, 
and their affiliates.”); Ingo Wallenborn, Competitiveness of U.S. Banks After Gramm-Leach-
Bliley: A Comparison Between the U.S. and European Regulatory Systems, 20 ANN. REV. 
BANKING L. 243, 251 (2001) (discussing the “firewall” limitation imposed by the Glass-
Steagall Act). 
 
 147. See Randall Smith, Citigroup Unseats Merrill Lynch as Busiest Underwriter, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 28, 2001, at C1 (“Citigroup Inc. has dislodged Merrill Lynch & Co. as Wall 
Street's biggest underwriter of stocks and bonds.”). 
 148. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 84, at 795. 
 149. 12 U.S.C. §1843(k)(4)(H) (2006). 
 150. For a description of those events see WESSEL, supra note 6, passim.  The subprime 
crisis had other ripple effects.  The Dow Jones Industrial average fell forty-seven percent on 
February 19, 2009 from the October 1, 2007 high of 14,087.  See E.S. Browning, Market 
Hits New Crisis Low, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at A1 (“The Dow industrials now have 
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 Subprime borrowers began defaulting in large numbers, as their 
adjustable rate mortgages (which had been originally issued at low “teaser” 
rates) reset at unaffordable levels.  Foreclosures became an epidemic in 
many communities across the country.  Fueling the subprime lending boom 
were mortgage brokers promoting “no-doc” or “low doc” (“liar”) loans that 
did not require the normal documentation of the borrower’s income and 
creditworthiness.  Credit quality did not concern the mortgage brokers and 
lenders making those loans because the loans were immediately securitized 
in a pool and then resold to investors as a collateralized debt obligation 
(“CDO”).151
The CDOs were often completed through so-called “warehouse” 
financing in which an investment bank loaned money to a subprime 
mortgage originator that generated subprime mortgages through mortgage 
brokers.  Those mortgages were sold back to the investment banker and 
placed in the investment banker’s warehouse until they could be securitized 
into a CDO.  The CDOs often had complex payment streams, and they 
were frequently insured against default by “monoline” insurance 





lost nearly half their value, or 47%, since their record close 16 months ago.”).  This 
devastated retirement savings, college and other endowments and, presumably, every other 
investor in the market.  Id. 
  Those protections allowed the “Super Senior” 
 151. For a description of the subprime mortgage market see MUOLO & PADILLA, supra 
note 111. 
 152. In a report to its shareholders, UBS AG described its CDO warehouse facility as 
follows: 
  In the initial stage of a CDO securitization, the [CDO] desk would typically 
enter into an agreement with a collateral manager. UBS sourced residential 
mortgage backed securities (“RMBS”) and other securities on behalf of the 
manager. These positions were held in a CDO Warehouse in anticipation of 
securitization into CDOs.  Generally, while in the Warehouse, these positions 
would be on UBS’s books with exposure to market risk. Upon completion of 
the Warehouse, the securities were transferred to a CDO special-purpose 
vehicle, and structured into tranches. The CDO desk received structuring fees 
on the notional value of the deal, and focused on Mezzanine (“Mezz”) CDOs, 
which generated fees of approximately 125 to 150 bp (compared with high-
grade CDOs, which generated fees of approximately 30 to 50 bp). Key to the 
growth of the CDO structuring business was the development of the credit 
default swap (“CDS”) on ABS in June 2005 (when ISDA published its CDS on 
ABS credit definitions). This permitted simple referencing of ABS through a 
CDS. Prior to this, cash ABS had to be sourced for inclusion in the CDO 
Warehouse. 
  Under normal market conditions, there would be a rise and fall in positions 
held in the CDO Warehouse line as assets were accumulated (“ramped up”) and 
then sold as CDOs. There was typically a lag of between 1 and 4 months 
between initial agreement with a collateral manager to buy assets, and the full 
ramping of a CDO Warehouse. 
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tranches in subprime securitizations to obtain triple-A credit ratings from 
the leading rating agencies, making them highly marketable in the U.S. and 
Europe. 
Subprime mortgages were sometimes pooled to fund off-balance-sheet 
commercial paper borrowings called “structured investment vehicles” 
(“SIVs”) or “asset-backed commercial paper” (“ABCP”).  Banks such as 
Citigroup used short-term commercial paper borrowings to purchase 
mortgages that were placed in trust.  The mortgages funded the commercial 
paper borrowings, providing a profit on the spread between the higher rates 
paid by mortgages and the lower rates then existing in the commercial 
paper market.  These carry trade programs were flawed, however.  In the 
event that commercial paper borrowers refused to roll over their loans, the 
SIV would have to liquidate their mortgages.  That roll over might not be 
possible in a major market downturn.  Another danger was that short-term 
rates could rise faster than long-term rates, eliminating the spread, or even 
inverting the payment stream.153
F. GLBA Critics 
 
The blame game began even before the end of the subprime crisis.  
Some critics argued that it was the removal of the Glass-Steagall barriers 
by the GLBA that allowed banks to enter into the subprime transactions 
that ultimately caused their massive losses.  One leader of the anti-GLBA 
faction was the New York Times.  In a front page story, the Times attacked 
Senator Phil Gramm, one of the sponsors of the GLBA, as having opened 
the door to the subprime crisis by deregulating a host of financial 
services.154
In late 1999, Mr. Gramm played a central role in what would be 
the most significant financial services legislation since the 
Depression. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, as the measure was 
called, removed barriers between commercial and investment 
banks that had been instituted to reduce the risk of economic 
catastrophes. Long sought by the industry, the law would let 
commercial banks, securities firms and insurers become financial 
supermarkets offering an array of services.
  Among other things, the article reported that: 
155
 
UBS AG, SHAREHOLDER REPORT ON UBS’S WRITE-DOWNS § 4.2.2, at 13 (Apr. 18, 2008). 
 
 153. See CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN 82-84 (2008) 
(describing SIVs and their flaws). 
 154. See Eric Lipton & Stephen Labaton, A Deregulator Looks Back, Unswayed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2008, at A1 (“[I]n one remarkable stretch from 1999 to 2001, he pushed 
laws and promoted policies that he says unshackled businesses from needless restraints but 
his critics charge significantly contributed to the financial crisis that has rattled the nation.”). 
 155. Id.  Editor’s Note:  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act that was passed on July 15, 2010 adopted a modified version of the Volcker Rule.  Title 
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The Times further charged Gramm with creating (through other legislation 
that was enacted in 2000) a loophole that allowed credit default swaps, 
which destroyed AIG, to trade unregulated.156  Gramm was unrepentant.  
He blamed the crisis on faulty monetary policy and the politicization of 
mortgage lending.157
Another critic of the GLBA was former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker 
who served as the head of President Barack Obama’s Economic Recovery 
Advisory Board.  Volcker advocated that commercial banking activities 
should be separated from investment banking and that commercial banks 
should not be allowed to own or trade “risky” securities.
 
158  Volcker was 
initially unsuccessful in convincing the Obama administration to adopt 
such an approach.159  Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, on the other hand, 
urged a “more subtle approach.”160  Nevertheless, Volcker’s proposal was 
supported by Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England.161  A form 
of “narrow banking” was proposed by Senator John McCain—the former 
Republican presidential candidate—and Democratic Senator Maria 
Cantwell who jointly sponsored a bill in December 2009 that would restore 
Glass-Steagall’s dividing line between investment and commercial 
banking.162
 
VI, § 619 allows banks to invest up to 3 percent of their Tier 1 capital in hedge funds and 
private equity funds.  Such investments may not exceed 3 percent of the assets of the hedge 
fund or private equity group in which an investment is made. 
  However, one unnamed Treasury official was reported as 
 156. Id. 
 157. Phil Gramm, Deregulation and the Financial Panic, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at 
A17. 
 158. Banks have long been attacked for taking on too much risk, but as Walter Wriston, 
the former head of Citibank, noted in a book published in 1986, that business, and society 
itself, advances only through risk taking.  WALTER B. WRISTON, RISK & OTHER FOUR 
LETTER WORDS passim (1986). 
 159. See Louis Uchitelle, Volcker’s Voice, Often Heeded, Fails to Sell a Bank Strategy, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2009, at A1 (noting that Volcker “wants the nation’s banks to be 
prohibited from owning and trading risky securities, the very practice that got the biggest 
ones into deep trouble in 2008,” but that administrators refuse to “separate commercial 
banking from investment operations”). 
 160. See Stephen Labaton, Trying to Rein in “Too Big to Fail” Institutions, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 26, 2009, at A1 ([Bernanke] would prefer “a more subtle approach without losing the 
economic benefit of multifunction, international firms.”).  For a discussion of the conflicting 
views over renewal of Glass-Steagall, see David Wessel, Three Theories on Solving “Too 
Big to Fail” Problem, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2009, at A12  (discussing the government’s 
options going forward in order to prevent another too big to fail crisis). 
 161. Labaton, supra note 160, at A1. 
 162. Edward Luce, US Reformers Look Back to the Future, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 
19-20, 2009, at 2.  Robert E. Litan, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, proposed the 
concept of “narrow banking,” or “safe banking” as it is sometimes called, in a book 
published in 1987, more than a decade before the enactment of GLBA.  ROBERT E. LITAN, 
WHAT SHOULD BANKS DO? (1987).  Litan advocated dividing banks into separate entities, 
one of which would be a narrow bank that would only take government deposits and invest 
in U.S. government securities; other business would be prohibited.  Id.  The second entity 
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saying that bringing back Glass-Steagall “would be like going back to the 
Walkman.”163
U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner initially took another 
approach.  He advocated granting bank regulators the power to order large 
financial firms—even healthy ones—to sell off assets if their size 
threatened the economy.
 
164  This proposal represented a sort of tailored 
Glass-Steagall approach.  European regulators already forced large 
financial institutions that were bailed out during the subprime crisis to sell 
off non-core operations.  The European Union required such divestments as 
a condition for state-sponsored bailouts.  For example, the EU required the 
Royal Bank of Scotland to sell its profitable insurance operations, a 
commodity-trading unit, and a payment services firm.165  The British 
government broke up Northern Rock, the bank that was nationalized during 
the subprime crisis as a result of subprime exposures, into a “good” bank 
and a “bad” bank, such that assets could be sold.166  Similarly, the Dutch 
government ordered the ING Group to be broken up after a $14.9 billion 
bailout.167
On January 21, 2009, President Obama finally resolved the impasse in 
his administration regarding the revival of Glass-Steagall.  He announced 
that large banks would be limited in size, barred from trading for their own 





would essentially be banks in their present post-GLBA form, which would be allowed to 
deal freely in investment and commercial banking activities, except deposits would not have 
FDIC insurance.  Id.  Litan complained that banking lawyers had “created ‘virtually a 
cottage industry in the discovery and exploitation of loopholes in the [Glass-Steagall] act 
that render its intended restrictions less and less relevant to the marketplace.’”  George 
Melloan, Business World:  The Efficiency Argument for Banking Reform, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
29, 1987, at 15 (quoting Robert E. Litan, Reuniting Investment and Commercial Banking, 7 
CATO J. 803, 803 (1988)). 
  This Paul Volcker-inspired measure shook the stock market 
 163. Thomas Frank, Bring Back Glass-Steagall, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2010, at A21. 
 164. See Damian Paletta, U.S. Seeks Power to Force Even Strong Banks to Shrink, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 30, 2009, at A8 (reporting on Timothy Geithner’s proposal to overhaul banking 
rules). 
 165. Charles Forelle & Sara Munoz, EU Sheds Soft Touch for Iron Fist on Banks, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 4, 2009, at C1. 
 166. See Sharlene Goff, Brussels Agrees N Rock Break-up and Sale, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Oct. 29, 2009, at 8 (reporting the restructuring of Northern Rock into “good” and 
“bad” banks). 
 167. ING’s losses were largely attributable to subprime mortgage exposures in the 
United States.  See Eric Dash and Chris Nicholson, Post-Bailout Blues as Europe Orders 
ING Group to Sell 2 Units, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2009, at B1 (noting ING’s near collapse 
“under a mountain of troubled American mortgage assets”). 
 168. Jonathan Weisman, et al., New Bank Rules Sink Stocks, WALL ST. J., January 21, 
2010, at A1.  The proposed ban on proprietary trading would have doubtful effects since 
many of the larger banks had already curtailed those activities.  Kate Kelly, Banks Gear Up 
For Battle, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2010, at C1.  It was also unclear whether this restriction 
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when it was announced.169  It seemed to have been passed as a result of 
politics rather than economics,170
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORTGAGE-BACKED BONDS 
 and it begged the issue of whether the 
repeal of Glass-Steagall had contributed to the subprime crisis by opening 
the door to the mortgage-backed securities that were at the center of the 
storm. 
A. Nineteenth Century Bonds 
 In determining whether GLBA opened the door to the subprime 
crisis, some history is useful.  The subprime CDOs did not spring out 
unannounced after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.  Such 
instruments have existed for a long time, and proved to be problematic on 
more than one occasion.  The mortgage-backed security concept came to us 
from Europe.  “By the mid-1800s mortgage-backed bonds that were issued 
by mutually owned institutions (Landschaften), privately-owned, joint-
stock mortgage banks and a national monopoly bank (the Credit Foncier) 
traded in Germany and France at yields as low as government securities 
and in markets as thick and deep.”171
 The U.S. Mortgage Company was created by J.P. Morgan and 
others to sell high-yield mortgage-backed bonds in Europe during the 
1870s.  The Equitable Insurance Company organized the Mercantile Trust 
for originating and selling mortgages in the United States.  Both companies 
failed during the downturn in 1873 because of the poor quality of the 
 
 
would apply to hedge trades used to protect the banks from customer-associated risks.  Id. 
Volcker was reported to be soft-pedaling his prior proposal to completely restore the Glass-
Steagall restrictions, instead opting for a more limited form of that legislation.  Rachelle 
Younglai & Kevin Drawbaugh, Big Banks’ Risky Trading Should Be Curbed: Volcker, 
REUTERS, Feb. 1, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6110EZ20100202. 
 169. Javier C. Hernandez, Obama’s Bank Proposal Helps Erase the Month’s Gains, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at B6. 
 170. President Obama went on a rampage against Wall Street in January 2010.  See 
Jackie Calmes, With Populist Stance, Obama Takes on Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at 
A1 (discussing President Obama’s toughened approach to financial regulation).  He first 
announced plans for a tax on the large banks that would fund the bailout.  Id.  He then flew 
to Boston to bash the banks in support of a Senate race for the seat left open by Ted 
Kennedy’s death.  Id.  That effort failed, giving the Republicans enough votes to initially 
block the administration’s health care bill.  Id.  This angered the President, and he 
announced his plan to partially revive Glass-Steagall two days later.  Id. 
 171. Kenneth Snowden, What Can History Tell Us About the Crisis in Mortgage 
Securitizations?, FIN. HIST. MAG.  (Museum of Am. Fin., New York, N.Y.), Winter 2003, at 
16, 16.  A preliminary report by the European Union rejected the Volcker proposal.  Joe 
Kirwin, EU Finance Ministers to Hold Special Meeting to Consider New Obama Proposals 
for Banks, 42 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 295 (Feb. 22, 2010).  
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mortgages they were selling.172  More failures arrived in the 1890s, with the 
creation of mortgage companies that sold debentures that were backed by 
mortgages placed in trust accounts.  One such firm was the J.B. Watkins 
Land Mortgage Company in Kansas.  It placed the mortgages it originated 
in trust with the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. in New York.173  Debentures 
that were collateralized by the mortgages held in trust were then sold, a 
process that was used in this century to securitize subprime mortgages.  
J.B. Watkins suffered a liquidity crisis after the panic of 1893 because of 
the “nervousness of investors” that were calling in their loans.174  Only 
seven of the seventy-four companies licensed for such business survived 
the 1890s, due largely to the poor quality of the mortgages placed in 
trust.175
 In 1904, New York State authorized property title insurance 
companies to insure mortgage payments; the business of guaranteeing 
mortgages was an outgrowth of the title insurance business.
 
176  This statute 
laid the groundwork for a private mortgage insurance business that 
originated, insured, sold, and then serviced mortgages on both residential 
and commercial properties.  Beginning in 1906, mortgages were pooled 
and placed in trust, and interests in that trust were sold to investors as 
undivided shares in the pool in the form of collateral trust certificates.  “By 
1913 some of these companies also placed mortgage loans in trust, insured 
the payments on these loans, and sold participation certificates in these 
mortgages.”177
 The mortgage guarantee business began booming during World War 
I.  The number of mortgage guarantee companies in New York quintupled 
in the 1920s “and the volume of outstanding mortgage loan insurance grew 
from $0.5 to nearly $3 billion; $0.8 billion of this total was written on 
certificated mortgages.”
  These certificated mortgages could cover a single large 
commercial mortgage, a form of syndication, or a group of small residential 




 172. Snowden, supra note 171, at 17. 
  The Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Company 
guaranteed mortgages sold to investors by the Title Guarantee & Trust 
Company.  It guaranteed more than $2 billion of mortgages that were sold 
 173. For a description of the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., see Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan 
& Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 430-31 (1895) (describing allegations in the bill of the plaintiff, 
Charles Pollock, regarding the company’s profits and investment income in 1894). 
 174. See Watkins Land Mortgage Co.’s Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1894, at 13 (citing a 
statement by the receiver, J.B. Watkins, that nervousness of investors had led to the 
receivership). 
 175. Snowden, supra note 171, at 17. 
 176. Id. at 18. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
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to savings banks and other investors.179
B. The 1920s 
  This was the precursor of the 
monoline insurance companies that would eventually be at the center of the 
subprime crisis in 2007. 
Real estate bonds issued by investment banking firms were funding 
commercial real estate developments in the 1920s.  Initially, these real 
estate bonds covered only specific property, but were later expanded to 
include several properties under mortgage.  One program allowed investors 
to obtain a real estate bond for $1,000 that entitled them to participate in 
122 different mortgages.180
S.W. Straus & Co. offered bonds in the 1920s that had only second 
and third mortgages on commercial real estate, and then it offered bonds 
secured only by “general mortgages” and collateral trust bonds that were 
secured by subordinated mortgages.  “Typically a Straus bond yielded six 
percent, twice the rate paid on a commercial-bank saving deposit and more 
than two percentage points higher than the rate offered by savings 
banks.”
  The issuer of the bonds often agreed to 
repurchase the bonds at a discount in order to provide liquidity and make 
the bonds more attractive to investors. 
181  Mortgage bonds were issued in large amounts for overvalued 
properties, allowing the promoters to use the bonds to pay for the land, 
buildings and even provide a profit.  These real estate bonds were often 
supported by unreliable appraisals of the property, and problems associated 
with the properties were frequently undisclosed.182
Difficulties arose in 1926, when a real estate bond in Florida defaulted 
during a market downturn in the state, and the problem spread to New York 
as the real estate market softened.  Several real estate bond houses failed, 
including G.L. Miller & Co., the American Bond & Mortgage Company, 
and the Empire Bond & Mortgage Company.  G.L. Miller & Co. turned out 
to be little more than a Ponzi scheme, and it joined other real estate bond 
firms as targets of an investigation by the New York State Attorney 
General and by a committee of the American Construction Council, headed 
by Franklin D. Roosevelt.
 
183
Another failure was the New York Real Estate Securities Exchange, 
 
 
 179. MARKHAM, supra note 34, at 147.  The Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Co. reported 
profits of over $1 million in 1920 and 1921.  See Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Co., N.Y. 
TIMES, March 29, 1922, at 33 (reporting on the company’s gross receipts, net earnings and 
profit and loss surplus in 1921). 
 180. MARKHAM, supra note 34, at 147. 
 181. JAMES GRANT, MONEY OF THE MIND: BORROWING AND LENDING IN AMERICA FROM 
THE CIVIL WAR TO MICHAEL MILKEN 161 (1992). 
 182. MARKHAM, supra note 34, at 147. 
 183. GRANT, supra note 181, at 168. 
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which opened on October 1, 1929.184  Located at 12 East 41st Street, this 
exchange had a large trading floor and established listing requirements for 
real estate mortgage companies and trust securities.  The Stock Market 
Crash of 1929 occurred less than a month later, and the new exchange 
failed.185
In the 1920s, the New York State Department of Insurance regulated 
the mortgage guarantee companies.
 
186  In 1933, as those companies began 
defaulting, the department halted further mortgage guarantees, and took 
control of eighteen companies engaged in the business of guaranteeing and 
selling mortgages and mortgage certificates.187  The Moreland Act of 1907 
authorized the New York governor to appoint a “Moreland commissioner” 
to investigate a broad range of activities.188  Such a commissioner was 
appointed by New York Governor Herbert H. Lehman to investigate the 
collapse of the mortgage bond and mortgage guarantee market in that 
state.189  Ironically, Lehman was the son of one of the founders of the 
Lehman Brothers investment-banking firm, which would later be destroyed 
by the mortgage-backed bonds that were at the center of the subprime 
crisis.  The Moreland commissioner found that, as of December 31, 1933, 
there were over $800 million of outstanding mortgage certificates held by 
212,874 investors and covering 9,435 issues, most of which were in 
default.190
The House of Representatives appointed a “Select Committee” to 
investigate real estate bondholders’ reorganizations in 1934, following a 
protest by 10,000 defaulted mortgage bondholders in Chicago.  Headed by 
Congressman Adolf J. Sabath from Illinois, the Select Committee held 
hearings in Detroit, New York, Chicago and Milwaukee.  It found that some 
$10 billion in real estate bonds were outstanding and that $8 billion were in 




 184. MARKHAM, supra note 34, at 147. 
  
 185. Id. at 169-70. 
 186. Snowden, supra note 171, at 18. 
 187. Id. 
 188. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 6 (McKinney 1982). 
 189. GEORGE W. ALGER, REPORT OF THE MORELAND COMMISSIONER 3 (Oct. 5, 1934). 
 190. Id.  The Moreland commissioner found that mortgage bonds were often backed, in 
whole or in part, by vacant land that produced no income.  Id.  The commissioner also found 
that appraisals were often out of date and based on prices that had sharply declined.  Id.  In 
some instances, appraisal figures were determined by simply multiplying the amount of 
the loan by 150 percent, the statutory minimum, without any inspection of the property.  Id.  
Many properties on which mortgage bonds were sold in 1932 and 1933 were already in 
default when sold to investors.  David Saperstein, Director, Trading and Exchange Division, 
Address Before the National Mortgage Board of the National Association of Real Estate 
Boards: Real Estate Bond Issues of the Future (Oct. 23, 1935). 
 191. U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO 
INVESTIGATE BONDHOLDER REORGANIZATIONS 521-23 (May 16, 1938). 
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The leading issuers of those bonds were George M. Forman & Co., 
Greenebaum Sons Investment Co., American Bond & Mortgage Co., 
Central Trust Co., S.W. Straus & Co., H.O. Stone & Co., and Lackner Butz 
& Co. 
The Select Committee was concerned with abuses by so-called 
“protective committees,” which were formed ostensibly to protect the 
interests of defaulted mortgage bond owners, but were fraught with abuse, 
charging excessive fees and expenses.192  Over 10,000 protective 
committees formed between 1929 and 1933.  The Sabath investigation led 
to legislation that was incorporated in the Chandler Act in 1938, which 
gave the SEC an oversight role in corporate reorganizations.193  The 
Chandler Act was repealed in 1978.194
C. Government-Sponsored Enterprises 
 
The Great Depression caused an almost complete collapse of the 
banking system.  By the end of February 1933, it was common to see 
depositors standing “in long queues with satchels and paper bags to take 
gold and currency away from the banks to store in mattresses and old 
shoeboxes.  It seemed safer to put your life’s savings in the attic than to 
trust the greatest financial institutions in the country.”195  Such sights would 
not be witnessed again until the subprime crisis in 2007 touched off such a 
bank run in England.  By 1933, over 500,000 home mortgages had been 
foreclosed.196  At one point, mortgages were being foreclosed at a rate of 
1,000 per day.197  “By 1933 the mortgage market had effectively ceased to 
function.”198
 
 192. Id. 
  “Between 1929 and 1933, the stock of mortgage loans 
 193. Id. 
 194. Chandler Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840, repealed by Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. 
 195. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL: 1932-
1940, 39 (1963).  However, those foreclosures provided little relief to lenders because the 
properties, once taken over, were usually worth only a fraction of the debt they secured.  “In 
the conditions then prevailing, many of them could not be sold at any price.”  FEDERAL 
HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, THE FHA STORY IN SUMMARY 1 (1959). 
 196. Fred Wright, The Effect of New Deal Real Estate Residential Finance and 
Foreclosure Policies Made in Response to the Real Estate Conditions of the Great 
Depression, 57 ALA. L. REV. 231, 239 (2005). 
 197. Id. 
 198. BARRY P. BOSWORTH ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS 48 
(1987).  As would be the case in the subprime crisis, many loans had been extended to 
borrowers who could not afford them: 
[T]he attempt, fostered largely by financially interested groups on sentimental 
or emotional grounds, to extend homeownership to classes unable to afford it on 
the available terms and to sell others more expensive properties than they could 
afford, which has resulted in the assumption by many of debt charges far 
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declined fifteen percent and housing construction dropped eighty 
percent.”199
Several steps were taken to deal with the residential housing crisis.  
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (“FHLBB”) was created in 1932 to 
restart mortgage lending by the savings and loan associations.
 
200  The 
Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 created the Home Owner’s Loan 
Corporation (“HOLC”) to stop the massive foreclosures that were then 
occurring on home mortgages by replacing defaulted or troubled mortgages 
with new mortgages on terms that the homeowners could meet.201  The 
National Housing Act of 1934 created the Federal Housing Administration 
(“FHA”) to insure residential mortgages against default, a mission that it 
continues to carry out today.202
Another Depression era agency, the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (“RFC”), created the National Mortgage Association in 1938.  
That entity’s name was quickly changed to the Federal National Mortgage 
Association and is now universally referred to as “Fannie Mae.”  The 
Federal National Mortgage Association was authorized to buy FHA 
guaranteed loans from mortgage lenders.  It funded those operations 
through sales of bonds to the public.  This allowed mortgage lenders to 
originate mortgages that were guaranteed and then sold to the government.  
The government resold these mortgages to private investors around the 
country, thereby substantially expanding the ability to raise funds beyond 
the deposit base of individual lenders.  Once the loans were purchased, the 
mortgage lender could use the funds received from their sale to make 




Congress re-chartered Fannie Mae in 1968 as a privately owned 
company funded by private investors.  It was listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange.  Fannie Mae’s charter required it to “channel [its] efforts into 
increasing the availability and affordability of homeownership for low-, 
 
 
beyond their capacity to bear and thus swelled the volume of foreclosures, 
increased the fluctuations in real estate values, and destroyed the home-
ownership aspirations of others with adequate financial resources to undertake 
it. 
E.S. Wallace, Survey of Federal Legislation Affecting Private Home Financing Since 1932, 
5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 481, 482 (1938). 
 199. BOSWORTH, supra note 198, at 48. 
 200. The FHLBB advanced almost $450 million to its members between 1932 and 1938, 
with the peak outstanding amount reaching $200 million.  However, those lending 
operations were said to be merely “a small tea kettle full of hot water to pour on the iceberg 
of frozen home loans.”  E.S. Wallace, supra note 198, at 488. 
 201. HOLC spent $3.1 billion to refinance mortgages on more than one million homes 
between 1933 and 1936.  MARKHAM, supra note 34, at 172. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Wright, supra note 196, at 259. 
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moderate-, and middle-income Americans.”204  Reaching that goal caused 
Fannie Mae to fail during the subprime crisis.205  In the meantime, the 
banking industry faced a number of setbacks after inflation became a 
problem in the 1960s, resulting in the creation of another giant 
government-sponsored enterprise.206  A credit crunch occurred in 1966 that 
curbed mortgage lending and sharply reduced housing starts.207  Things 
seemed to have gotten better in 1967, but another credit crunch hit in 
1968.208  The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 created the 
Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae,” sometimes 
also called “GNMA”).209  Ginnie Mae did not itself originate loans.  Rather, 
it acted as a guarantor of loans originated in the private sector, but which 
had federal involvement from the Federal Housing Authority, the Veterans 
Administration, or other government-sponsored programs that were 
encouraging broader access to credit by particular segments of society.210
In 1969, interest rates reached historic levels, further reducing 
mortgage lending.
 
211  The Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 was 
passed to relieve this situation.212
D. Securitizing Mortgages 
  Among other things, this legislation 
created the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) for 
the purpose of providing a mechanism for the purchase of mortgage loans 
from savings institutions.  It, too, was allowed to purchase conventional 
mortgages and guarantee them, but not with an explicit guarantee from the 
federal government.  However, Freddie Mac also had an implicit 
government guarantee, and it too would fail during the subprime crisis. 
The securitization concept is not a new one.  The process essentially 
involves the sale of a future stream of payments, or some other asset, 
whose value will be realized at some time in the future.  An early example 
of securitization was found in Amsterdam in the seventeenth century.213
 
 204. Jason T. Strickland, The Proposed Revelatory Changes to Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac: An Analysis, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 267, 270 (2004) (citations omitted). 
  
 205. ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL 182-185 (2009). 
 206. Richard W. Bartke, Fannie Mae and the Secondary Mortgage Market, 66 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1 (1971). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. PETER CHINLOY, REAL ESTATE: INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL STRATEGY 216 (1988). 
 210. Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 
2198-99 (2007). 
 211. Bartke, supra note 206, at 48. 
 212. Pub. L. No. 91-351, § 303(a), 84 Stat. 450, 452 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 
1452 (2006)). 
 213. WILLIAM J. BERNSTEIN, A SPLENDID EXCHANGE: HOW TRADE SHAPED THE WORLD 
235-36 (2008). 
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There, a corps of women recruited sailors for the Dutch East India 
Company by luring them off the streets through promises of food, shelter, 
drink and sex.  The women were paid a portion of the future wages of their 
recruits.  The right to receive those payments was evidenced by a 
marketable security issued by the company that was called a transportbrief.  
Those securities were purchased by zielkoopers (“buyers of souls”) at a 
discount that reflected the high death rate of the sailors.214  By pooling the 
securities, the zielkoopers were able to diversify their risks.  However, a 
rising mortality rate for the sailors bankrupted many of these merchants.  
Subprime lenders would have a similar experience in this century.215
A conceptually similar concept was adopted by Ginnie Mae when it 
began the sale of pooled mortgages in the United States in 1970 in the form 
of “pass-through certificates” that gave an investor a pro rata portion of the 
principal and interest payments received from mortgages placed in the 
pool.
 
216  This process allowed lenders to originate loans, to sell the loans 
through Ginnie Mae, and then to use the proceeds of that sale to originate 
more loans.217  The certificates guaranteed by Ginnie Mae were called 
“pass-through” because they simply passed the monthly mortgage 
payments on the mortgages held in the pool onto the certificate holders.218  
This meant that the certificate holder received monthly interest payments 
plus an amortized portion of the principal on the mortgage.  In initial 
stages, the principal payments were only a small portion of the monthly 
payment, but, as the principal on the mortgage was reduced over time, the 
portion of the principal payment grew each month.219  This payment stream 
raised some complex yield issues and reinvestment concerns.220
Many mortgages are paid off before their maturity because 
homeowners move or purchase a more expensive home as their income 
grows.  Homeowners also refinance their mortgages when interest rates 
drop.  This results in a return of principal on that mortgage, which is then 
passed through to the holders of Ginnie Mae certificates.  The holder of the 
certificate then has to reinvest those funds.  If interest rates had dropped 
 
 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Eduardo F. Rodriguez, Comment, Ask Not What Your Government Can Do for You, 
Ask What Your Government Can Do for Small Business: A Proposal for Government 
Involvement in the Securitization of Conventional Small Business Loans, 2 FIU L. REV. 143, 
147 (2007); see also About Ginnie Mae: The Pioneer of Mortgage-Backed Securities, 
http://www.ginniemae.gov/about/ 
history.asp?subTitle=About (last visited Mar. 29, 2010) (discussing how Ginnie Mae 
“revolutionized the American housing industry in 1970 by pioneering the issuance of 
mortgage-backed securities.”). 
 217. Rodriguez, supra note 215, at 147 
 218. Id. 
 219. MARKHAM II, supra note 114, at 143. 
 220. Id. 
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since the purchase of the pass-through certificate, then reinvestment would 
have to be made at the then-existing lower interest rate, which would 
displease the certificate holder.  This creates a reinvestment risk.  Because 
of this repayment feature, pass-through securities do not react in the same 
manner as corporate bond prices when interest rates fall.  Bond prices 
generally increase when interest rates fall because the holder is now 
receiving a higher interest rate than is available in the market.  In contrast, 
pass-through certificates may not increase at the same rate because there 
will be a greater prepayment of principal from accelerated refinancings that 
must be reinvested at lower market rates.221
Freddie Mac sought to address the investment concerns associated 
with the pass-through securities developed by Ginnie Mae.  Freddie Mac 
began offering “collateralized mortgage obligations” (“CMOs”), also 
known as “real estate mortgage investment conduits” (“REMICs”).
 
222  The 
CMO was a product that was created for Freddie Mac, in 1983, by Larry 
Fink, who was then working at First Boston Corporation.223  Fink went on 
to head BlackRock Inc., a giant asset manager, and played a prominent role 
in managing distressed pooled mortgage assets during the subprime 
crisis.224
The CMO instrument divided principal and interest payments from the 
mortgages placed in the pool into different payment streams.  Unlike pass-
through securities, principal and interest payments were not passed through 
to CMO investors pro rata.  Instead, the CMO mortgage payments were 
divided into separate tranches with varying payment streams and with 
differing maturities, seniority, subordination, or other characteristics.  This 
allowed investors to choose between a longer-term investment and an 
investment with a shorter term.  The long-term investor was given some 
protection from prepayment risks by a requirement that principal 
repayments first be directed to the short-term investors.  Only when they 
were completely paid off would the longer-term tranches start receiving 
principal payments. 
 
CMOs were popular after they were introduced in 1986 and 1987.  
The CMO concept was designed to guard against the prepayment risk; 
however, investors lost sight of a different risk posed by such securities.  
There is an “extension” risk, which is the opposite of the prepayment risk.  
Extension risk occurs where there is an unusual increase in interest rates.  
In such an event, homeowners will be reluctant to sell their homes or to 
 
 221. Id. 
 222. John C. Cody, Comment, The Dysfunctional “Family Resemblance” Test: After 
Reves v. Ernst & Young, When are Mortgage Notes “Securities”?, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 761, 
784 (1994). 
 223. Katrina Booker, Can this Man Save Wall Street?, FORTUNE, Nov. 10, 2008, at 102. 
 224. Id. 
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refinance them because they will have to pay a higher interest rate on a new 
mortgage.  This means that the certificate holder will be locked in for a 
longer than predicted period of time, causing a drop in the value of the 
certificate because the certificate holder will be receiving a lower rate than 
what prevails in the market for a longer-than-predicted time.225
Interest rates had been stable in the years following the introduction of 
the CMO.  That situation changed on February 4, 1994, when the Federal 
Reserve Board increased short-term interest rates for the first time in five 
years.  The Federal Reserve Board then embarked on a series of rate 
increases that had some disastrous effects on the bond markets.  CMOs 
were crushed by these increases because they virtually stopped mortgage 
repayments, extending the average maturity of CMOs.
 
226  A valuation 
problem surfaced during the collapse of the CMO market.  Some of the 
tranches in the CMOs were so complex that Goldman Sachs had to use 
multiple supercomputers to run simulations of cash flows under different 
interest-rate scenarios.227
V. GLASS-STEAGALL AND BANK SECURITIZATIONS 
  This problem presaged the valuation issues that 
would emerge during the subprime crisis in 2007. 
A. Private Issue Mortgage-Backed Securities 
Mortgage-backed securities issued by commercial banks had appeared 
well before the GLBA repealed the Glass-Steagall Act.  “In 1977, Bank of 
America and Salomon Brothers first issued ‘a security where outstanding 
loans were held in trust, with investors as beneficiaries.’”228  National 
banks were actually encouraged to begin their own private mortgage-
backed securitizations after Congress amended the banking laws in 1982 to 
allow those banks to “make, arrange, purchase or sell loans or extensions of 
credit secured by liens on interests in real estate,” subject to limitations 
imposed by the OCC.229  In addition, in 1984, Congress passed the 
Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act (“SMMEA”),230
 
 225. See generally Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017 (4th 
Cir. 1997) (describing these risks).  CMOs often contained exotic tranches, including 
inverse floaters and inverse interest-only strips that converted fixed rate mortgages into 
floating rate tranches.  MORRIS, supra note 153, at 39-41. 
 seeking to 
allow “private issuers of mortgage securities to compete effectively with 
 226. MORRIS, supra note 153, at 42. 
 227. MARKHAM II, supra note 114, at 144. 
 228. Jennifer Cummins, Historical Changes Within the Credit and Investment Markets, 
in Developments in Banking and Financial Law 2006-2007: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 
27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 21, 26 (2008) (quoting Peterson, supra note 210, at 2200). 
 229. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1510 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2006)). 
 230. Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2006)). 
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government-related agencies, which had come to dominate the market, by 
removing some of the legal impediments to issuing private mortgage-
backed securities.”231
In Securities Industry Ass’n v. Clarke,
 
232 the Second Circuit upheld a 
1987 determination by the OCC that the Glass-Steagall Act did not bar a 
national bank from selling mortgage-backed securities.233  The Court 
recognized that national banks have long been viewed to have the 
incidental power to sell mortgages.234
The popularity of the mechanism confirms what seems apparent, 
that many investors who might be wary of the risk of investing in 
a single mortgage loan will be willing to invest in a pool of loans.  
With the increased marketability that pass-through certificates 
make possible comes increased liquidity, an important benefit as 
banks face the task of funding long term mortgage loans with 
short term deposits.
  It stated: 
235
Over $1 trillion of asset-backed securities involving family mortgages 
were outstanding in 1991.  NationsBank (now Bank of America) 
securitized $1.4 billion of commercial real estate mortgages in 1996 and 
$800 million in other mortgages.
 
236
B. Subprime Mortgage Lending 
  From this analysis, it appears that 
GLBA was not a factor in commercial banks underwriting CMOS or their 
successor, the CDO.  Further analysis is needed to determine if GLBA was 
a significant factor in allowing commercial banks to securitize subprime 
loans as opposed to the more traditional conventional mortgages. 
Another consideration is whether GLBA allowed the commercial 
banks to enter the subprime mortgage market.  Historically, subprime 
lending was avoided by most commercial banks because of the credit risks 
associated with such loans.  A subprime loan is one that has a high 
 
 231. Cummins, supra note 228, at 26; see also KENNETH G. LORE, MORTGAGE-BACKED 
SECURITIES: DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET 1-22 
(1994) (providing brief overview of the SMMEA and noting its purpose to “expand 
significantly the role of the private sector . . . in this expanding credit market”). 
 232. 885 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990). 
 233. A student comment also concluded in 1987 that, notwithstanding Glass-Steagall, 
banks had “the authority to issue and to underwrite, but not to deal in, their own CMOs” and 
that they lacked the authority to issue, underwrite, or deal in third-party CMOs.  Susan M. 
Golden, Comment, Collateralized Mortgage Obligations: Probing the Limits of National 
Bank Powers Under the Glass-Steagall Act, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 1025, 1030 (1987). 
 234. Clarke, 885 F.2d at 1044 (citing First Nat’l Bank v. City of Hartford, 273 U.S. 548, 
560 (1927)) (acknowledging that the Comptroller relied on three bases for determining that 
banks have such authority). 
 235. Clarke, 885 F.2d at 1049. 
 236. MARKHAM II, supra note 114, at 240. 
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likelihood of default because the borrower is not creditworthy.  Although 
there are no uniform standards for classifying a loan as subprime, a loan is 
generally viewed to be such if the borrower falls within one of the 
following categories: (1) those with a poor credit history; (2) those with no 
credit history; and (3) borrowers who have existing credit but who are 
overextended.237  FICO credit scores are also used to identify subprime 
borrowers.238
To avoid losses from risky subprime loans, large banks traditionally 
“redlined” areas of the communities where subprime borrowers lived, and 
refused to make mortgage loans in those areas.
 
239  Minorities were often 
concentrated in the redlined areas, and this practice came to be viewed as 
racially discriminatory.240  In order to stop the practice of redlining, 
Congress enacted the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA), 
which required banking institutions in metropolitan areas to disclose their 
mortgage loans by classification and geographic location, under the 
assumption that such disclosures would reveal discriminatory lending 
patterns.241
 
 237. Evan M. Gilreath, Note, The Entrance of Banks Into Subprime Lending: First 
Union and the Money Store, 3 N.C. BANKING INST. 149, 150-51 (1999). 
 
 238. As one court noted: 
[M]ost lenders[] use a credit score system called “FICO.” Named for the 
system’s creator, Fair Isaac Credit Organization, FICO refers to a method for 
calculating a borrower's credit worthiness. FICO’s workings are largely 
proprietary, but based on the information in a credit bureau’s files—e.g., credit 
card usage and payment history, other revolving loan history, installment loan 
history, previous bankruptcy, judgments, and liens—FICO returns a score 
between 300 and 800. The higher the score, the more creditworthy the 
borrower; the more creditworthy the borrower, the less likely the borrower is to 
default. 
  Though “subprime” has no universal definition, . . . industry custom regarded 
660 as the prime-subprime dividing line. Further, the US median score is 720. 
The dispersion is such that only 27% of the population has a score below 650 
and 15% of the population scores below 600. 
In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1146-47 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 
(citations omitted). 
 239. The Federal Housing Administration had employed a similar practice of denying 
mortgage insurance in poorer communities.  See Ngai Pindell, Is There Hope for HOPE 
VI?: Community Economic Development and Localism, 35 CONN. L. REV. 385, 399 n.76 
(2003) (“The FHA extended the segmentation of neighborhoods through redlining.  In 
providing insurance to private lenders for long-term mortgage loans, the FHA disfavored 
areas occupied by racial minorities.”).  That practice was later changed to direct FHA 
insurance to subprime borrowers.  See Kerry D. Vandell, FHA Restructuring Proposals: 
Alternatives and Implications, 6 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 299 (1995) (providing a detailed 
description of the history and evolution of the FHA). 
 240. See generally Nat’l State Bank, Elizabeth, N.J. v. Long, 630 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 
1980) (describing this practice). 
 241. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, 89 Stat. 1125 
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The Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) of 1977 went a step 
further, requiring affirmative action by banks in meeting the credit needs of 
minorities in their service areas.242  The CRA made loaning to subprime 
areas a statutory condition for receiving approval from bank regulators for 
bank mergers.243  The CRA had little immediate effect until restrictions on 
bank branching and interstate mergers were eased.  In particular, the 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994244 
removed the barriers posed by the so-called Douglas Amendment on 
interstate bank mergers.245  Other barriers to interstate branching were 
dropped in 1997, allowing nationwide banking under a single charter.246
A 1992 study by the Federal Reserve Bank in Boston charged that 
there was strong statistical evidence of racial discrimination in mortgage 
lending.
  
This set off an interstate bank merger boom, which required CRA credits. 
247  Members of Congress, including Barney Frank of 
Massachusetts and Senator Christopher Dodd of Connecticut, used that 
study to push for more subprime lending.248  The Clinton administration 
adopted that platform and took advantage of this new demand for bank 
mergers through its National Homeownership Strategy, which sought to 
increase home ownership by subprime borrowers through the lever of the 
CRA.249  That strategy was assisted by new CRA requirements, which, “in 
the words of the Federal Reserve Governor who wrote the regulations, set 
up soft quotas on lending in underserved areas.”250
 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2811 (2006)). 
  The Clinton 
 242. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147 (codified 
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901 et seq. (2006)). 
 243. See generally Joseph Moore, Community Reinvestment Act and Its Impact on Bank 
Mergers, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 412 (1997) (describing this legislation and the problems it 
engendered). 
 244. Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994). 
 245. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d).  See Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159 (1985) (describing the scope of the Douglas Amendment). 
 246. Riegle-Neal authorized interstate branching by merger or acquisition of a bank 
unless a state opted out of such branching.  New branches were not authorized unless a state 
passed a law affirmatively allowing it.  Congress gave the states until May 31, 1997 to 
determine whether they would opt out.  12 U.S.C. §36(g). 
 247. Alicia H. Munnell, Lynn E. Browne, James MoEneaney & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 
Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data 43-44 (Fed. Reserve Bank of 
Boston, Working Paper No. 92-7, Oct. 1992). 
 248. CHARLES GASPARINO, THE SELLOUT 110-11 (2007). 
 249. See William J. Clinton, U.S. President, White House: Remarks on the National 
Homeownership Strategy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 805 (June 5, 1995) (noting that the 
homeownership strategy “help[s] moderate income families who pay high rents but haven’t 
been able to save enough for a downpayment . . . [and] lower income working families who 
are ready to assume the responsibilities of home ownership but [are] held back by mortgage 
costs that are just out of reach”). 
 250. Modernizing America’s Financial Regulatory Structure: Hearing Before the Cong. 
Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. 12 (Jan. 14, 2009) (testimony of Marc Sumerlin, Managing 
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administration’s CRA efforts led to an eighty percent increase in the 
number of subprime mortgages.251  “Subprime mortgage originations grew 
from $35 billion in 1994 to $140 billion in 2000, indicating an average 
annual growth rate of 26%.”252
The Federal Reserve Board advised banks that CRA loans were to be 
made in a safe and sound manner.
 
253  That admonition begged the question:  
how do you make a safe and sound subprime loan when, as Federal 
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has candidly admitted, those borrowers 
pose a “high credit risk?”254  The solution for this counterparty risk 
problem was solved by the Clinton administration when CRA regulations 
were amended in 1995 to allow CRA-based subprime loans to be 
securitized.255  Securitization provided the banks with a way to move 
subprime loans off their balance sheets, and it allowed “lenders to shift 
mortgage credit risk and interest rate risk to investors who have greater risk 
tolerance.”256
Commercial banks were soon making massive CRA commitments.  
For example, Washington Mutual made a CRA pledge of $120 billion in its 
  Once again, it seems clear that GLBA played little, if any, 
role in the development of the CDO market for subprime mortgages. 
 
Director and Co-Founder, The Lindsey Group), available at 
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/testimony-011409-sumerlin.pdf. 
 251. Roberta Achtenberg, a HUD assistant secretary, established a nationwide CRA 
enforcement program that was designed to compel banks to make subprime loans.  As one 
author asserts: 
Banks were compelled to jump into line, and soon they were making thousands 
of loans without any cash-down deposits whatsoever, an unprecedented 
situation. Mortgage officers inside the banks were forced to bend or break their 
own rules in order to achieve a good Community Reinvestment Act rating, 
which would please the administration by demonstrating generosity to 
underprivileged borrowers even if they might default. Easy mortgages were the 
invention of Bill Clinton’s Democrats. 
MCDONALD & ROBINSON, supra note 9, at 4. 
 252. Elizabeth Laderman, Subprime Mortgage Lending and the Capital Markets, FRBSF 
ECONOMIC LETTER (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., S.F., Cal.), Dec. 28, 2001, at 1, available at   
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2001/el2001-38.pdf. 
 253. See Fed. Reserve Bd., Community Reinvestment Act, July 10, 2008, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/dcca/cra (“Nor does the law require institutions to make 
high-risk loans that jeopardize their safety.  To the contrary, the law makes it clear that an 
institution’s CRA activities should be undertaken in a safe and sound manner.”). 
 254. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago’s 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition: The Subprime 
Mortgage Market (May 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070517a.htm. 
 255. Russell Roberts, How Government Stoked the Mania, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2008, at 
A21. 
 256. Cynthia Angell & Clare D. Rowley, Breaking New Ground in U.S. Mortgage 
Lending, FDIC OUTLOOK (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Wash., D.C.), Summer 2006, at 21, 22. 
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1998 acquisition of HF Ahmanson & Co.257  The merger of Citibank and 
the Travelers Group in 1999 resulted in a ten-year, $115 billion CRA 
pledge.258  Bank of America made a ten-year CRA subprime lending pledge 
of $750 billion when it merged with FleetBoston Financial Corp. in 
2003.259  JPMorgan Chase made a larger $800 billion CRA pledge when it 
merged with Bank One Corp. in 2004.260  One website, which is highly 
critical of these pledges, claims that total CRA commitments by banks 
reached $4.2 trillion by 2004.261
The Federal Reserve Board has contended that the CRA did not cause 
the subprime crisis because many subprime loans did not have CRA 
credit.
 
262   One author argues that the CRA was not responsible for the 
subprime crisis for three reasons:  (1) few CRA loan applications were 
denied, a fact which the author seems to suggest demonstrates that they 
were good loans; (2) many of the players in the subprime market were not 
regulated banks; and (3) most subprime loans originated in California, 
Florida and Nevada, leading the author to believe that the CRA had little 
effect elsewhere, and therefore was not to blame.263  These claims overlook 
the fact that the CRA required, and thereby legitimatized, subprime lending 
by institutions that had previously shied away from such risky loans.  As 
former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan testified before 
Congress in October 2008: “’It’s instructive to go back to the early stages 
of the subprime market, which has essentially emerged out of the CRA.’”264
After being forced into the market by the federal government, banks 




 257. Jaret Seiberg, Minority Report, THE DAILY DEAL, Nov. 3, 2003, available at 
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-109542717/minority-report.html. 
 Yet, this is another unfortunate legacy 
of the CRA.  Former Senator Phil Gramm noted:  “It was not just that CRA 
and federal housing policy pressured lenders to make risky loans—but that 
they gave lenders the excuse and regulatory cover” to enter what was 
 258. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 84, at 405-06. 
 259. Craig Lender, B of A Chief Raps CRA Overhaul, AM. BANKER, Apr. 26, 2004, at 8. 
 260. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 84, at 405-06. 
 261. Steve Sailer, The Minority Mortgage Meltdown (cont.): Charting the CRA Crackup, 
VDARE.COM, Feb. 15, 2009, http://www.vdare.com/sailer/090215_cra.htm. 
 262. Randall S. Kroszner, Governor, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Confronting 
Concentrated Poverty Policy Forum: The Community Reinvestment Act and the Recent 
Mortgage Crisis (Dec. 3, 2008), in REVISITING THE CRA: PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE OF 
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 8 (2009).  Both the Clinton and George W. Bush 
administrations also pushed toward more subprime lending by two giant government-
sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  By 2000, about fifty percent 
of their portfolios were subprime products.  The Subprime Lending Bias, INVESTOR’S 
BUSINESS DAILY, Dec. 22, 2008, at A14.  That quota was increased to fifty-two percent in 
2005.  WILLIAM D. COHEN, HOUSE OF CARDS 297 (2009). 
 263. Charles E. Daye, Stripping Off Market Accountability: Housing Policy Perspectives 
on the Crisis in the Financial System, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 105, 110-11 (2009). 
 264. Gramm, supra note 157, at A17 (citation omitted). 
MARKHAMFINALIZED_THREE_UPDATED 9/9/2010  4:47 PM 
1124 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:4 
 
appearing to be a lucrative business in which risks could be managed 
through securitizations.265  The proof is in the pudding.  Subprime lenders 
were initially an industry unto themselves because large banks avoided 
such lending, until the CRA pushed them into it.  There were only ten 
lenders in the subprime market in 1994, but their numbers increased to fifty 
by 1998.  By 2001, as the result of the CRA, ten of the twenty-five largest 
subprime lenders were banks or their affiliates.266
It seems clear from these numbers that Glass-Steagall imposed no 
significant barrier to commercial banks in making subprime loans.  Indeed, 
GLBA tried to stop some abuses associated with the CRA.  Community 
activist groups were demanding funding from banks as a condition for not 
protesting mergers on CRA grounds to bank regulators.  Since mergers 
were the principal growth mechanism for large banks, many of them gave 
into this CRA “extortion.”
 
267  These community groups also demanded 
allocations of loans to particular neighborhoods.  The CRA “‘put a wad of 
power in the hands of community organizations to damage banks that they 
felt weren’t doing enough for poor people.  These community organizations 
became the dispensers of money for zero-down mortgages for poor people, 
again a lovely thing, but it didn’t turn out so well.’”268  Senator Gramm 
inserted a provision in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 that required 
reports to be filed disclosing any CRA extortion payments, hoping that 
disclosure would embarrass those groups and keep such demands to a 
minimum.269
C. Credit Default Swaps 
 
The Glass-Steagall Act also proved to be no barrier to banks to enter 
the over-the-counter derivatives business.  As a result of legislation passed 
in 1992, swaps were exempted from regulation under the Commodity 
Exchange Act of 1936.270
 
 265. Id. 
  Even before the enactment of that exemption, 
 266. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra, note 84, at 412. 
 267. Susan Sirota Gaetano, An Overview of Financial Services Reform 1998, 5 CONN. 
INS. L. J. 793, 807 n.129 (1999). 
 268. COHEN, supra note 262, at 297 (quoting Russell Roberts, professor of economics at 
George Mason University). 
 269. Phil Gramm, The New Banking Legislation: The Financial Modernization for the 
Twenty-First Century, 53 SMU L. REV. 371, 373 (2000); see also Jonathan R. Macey & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. 
REV. 291, 294 (1993) (finding that the CRA has done more harm than good). 
 270. Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590.  The 
Fed approved an application by J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc. in 1982 that allowed that bank to 
create a subsidiary that would register with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission as 
a futures commission merchant that could act as a broker in a number of commodity futures 
contracts.  Jerry W. Markham & David J. Gilberg, Federal Regulation of Bank Activities in 
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the swap had grown to a notional amount of some $4 trillion by the end of 
1991.271  The top dealers in OTC derivatives in 1993 (six years before the 
repeal of Glass-Steagall) were commercial banks, including Chemical 
Bank, Citicorp, Bankers Trust, Société Générale, J.P. Morgan, and the 
Union Bank of Switzerland.272  Some seventy percent of Bankers Trust’s 
first quarter profits in 1994 came from derivative products.  In total, 
commercial banks accounted for a notional amount of as much as $14 
trillion in derivatives sales.273
The credit default swap was in place before the passage of GLBA.  
The OCC issued a bulletin in 1996 that set forth supervisory guidelines for 
a “new set of derivative products” in the form of “credit derivatives” that 
are “marketed as an efficient way to manage credit exposure.”
 
274  One such 
instrument was the CDS, which the bulletin compared to a traditional 
standby letter of credit, and which would play a large role in the failure of 
the America International Group, Inc. during the subprime crisis.275  The 
OCC bulletin opined that the CDS could provide national banks with 
substantial benefits, such as allowing them to hedge concentration risks and 
credit deterioration of an asset and to adjust their credit profiles in a 
particular industry.  The bulletin further noted the need for adequate 
supervisory procedures to guard against the several risks posed by the 
CDS, including credit, liquidity, price, transaction and strategic risks.276
 
the Commodities Markets, 39 BUS. LAW. 1719 (1984). 
  
 271. Jerry W. Markham, “Confederate Bonds,” “General Custer,” and the Regulation 
of Derivative Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 3, n.8 (1994). 
 272. MARKHAM II, supra note 114 at 240. 
 273. Id. 
 274. O.C.C. Bulletin 96-43, to Chief Executive Officers of all National Banks, 
Department and Division Heads, and all Examining Personnel, at 1 (Aug. 12, 1996), 
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/96-43.doc. 
 275. The OCC Bulletin described a CDS as follows: 
The risk hedger (i.e., buyer of credit protection) pays a fee, which effectively 
represents an option premium, in return for the right to receive a conditional 
payment if a specified “reference credit” defaults. A reference credit is simply 
the party whose credit performance will determine credit derivative cash 
flows. Typically, the reference credit has a borrowing relationship with the bank 
that is buying credit protection. The bank may diversify its portfolio by 
reducing its exposure to the borrower, and the swap enables it to do so without 
disturbing its relationship with the customer. The methods used to determine the 
amount of the payment that would be triggered by the default vary by 
instrument. In some contracts, the amount of the payment is agreed upon at the 
inception of the contract. In others, the amount paid is determined after the 
default event and is based upon the observed prices of similar debt obligations 
of the borrower in the corporate bond market. A default event typically must 
exceed a materiality threshold in order to trigger a payment under the swap 
contract. 
Id. at 2. 
 276. Id.  
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The OCC was right to be concerned because ten years later those risks 
would eventually manifest themselves in the subprime crisis.  The OCC 
bulletin made clear that CDS were in wide use by banks at least three years 
before the repeal of Glass-Steagall by GLBA. 
VI. WHAT CAUSED THE SUBPRIME CRISIS? 
A. Excessive risk? 
The GLBA is going to be hard to finger as a culprit in the subprime 
crisis, so what really caused the crisis?  The press and the federal 
government are blaming the subprime crisis on excessive risk taking by 
bank executives seeking large bonuses from compensation systems that 
were skewed toward encouraging excessive risk.  However, significant 
amounts of commercial and investment bank subprime losses (and AIG’s 
CDS losses) came from their exposure to the “Super-Senior” tranches of 
the subprime CDOs which, because of the CDO credit enhancement 
features, were often given triple-A ratings.277  Therefore, such instruments 
were by definition extremely low risk, and the banks had no reason to 
believe otherwise.  Indeed, bank regulators in the United States allowed 
reduced, favorable capital treatment of Super Seniors when carried on bank 
balance sheets, provided that the Super Senior had a triple-A credit 
rating.278
For example, Merrill Lynch’s U.S. CDO subprime net exposure 
consisted primarily of its Super Senior CDO portfolio.
  This regulatory blessing removed any concern of undue risk 
normally associated with subprime debt and the commercial banks loaded 
up the truck with these instruments. 
279  Merrill Lynch 
wrote down $5.7 billion in 2008 due to its exposure to Super Senior 
CDOs.280  This write-down was the result of two actions.  On September 
18, 2008, Merrill Lynch sold $30.6 billion gross notional amount of Super 
Senior CDOs to Lone Star Funds for $6.7 billion, which accounted for $4.4 
billion of the write-down.281  The remainder of the write-down was a result 
of Merrill Lynch “terminat[ing] certain hedges with monoline financial 
guarantors related to U.S. super senior ABS CDOs.”282
 
 277. See, e.g., Susanne Craig, Randall Smith, Merrill Aims to Raise Billions More:  Firm 
Dumps Mortgage Assets as Crisis Drags On; Another Big Write-Down,  WALL ST. J., July 
29, 2008, at A1 (discussing Merrill Lynch’s decision to sell “$30 billion in toxic mortgage-
related assets at a steep loss” in order to “purge” its balance sheet of perpetual problems). 
 
 278. GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD 63-64 (Free Press 2009). 
 279. MERRILL LYNCH, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 27 (2008). 
 280. Id. at 19-20. 
 281. Id. at 19, 28. 
 282. Id. at 19.  Merrill Lynch sustained other massive losses in 2008, but most seem to 
be the result of adverse market conditions spawned by the subprime crisis.  Merrill Lynch 
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Like Merrill Lynch, Citigroup’s write-downs related to Super Senior 
CDOs came from its exposure to owning the instruments, as well as from 
losses related to its hedges with monoline financial guarantors for those 
instruments.283  “As of September 30, 2007, Citigroup’s Securities and 
Banking (S&B) Business held approximately $55 billion in U.S. subprime 
direct exposure, $43 billion of which was due to exposures in the most 
super senior tranches of CDOs.”284  Of Citigroup’s $14.3 billion pre-tax 
loss (net of hedges) from subprime-related direct exposure, $12 billion was 
attributable to “net exposures to the super senior tranches of CDOs . . . 
derivatives on asset-backed securities or both.”285  Citigroup also “recorded 
a pretax loss on CVA of $5.736 billion on its exposure to monoline 
insurers,” the majority of which related to hedges on Super Senior 
positions.286
 
thus experienced “[n]et losses due to credit valuation adjustments (“CVA”) related to certain 
hedges with financial guarantors of $10.4 billion.”  Id. at 18.  Since $1.3 billion was tied to 
super senior ABS CDO hedging, the remaining $9.1 billion of losses was related to other 
hedges.  A total of $10.2 billion (excluding CVA) was written down on U.S. ABS CDOs, of 
which $5.8 billion was not related to super senior ABS CDO exposure.  Id.  Another $10.8 
billion written down was “related to other-than-temporary impairment charges recognized 
on our U.S. banks’ investment securities portfolio, losses related to leveraged finance loans 
and commitments, losses related to certain government sponsored entities (“GSEs”) and 
major U.S. broker-dealers, the default of a major U.S. broker-dealer and other market 
dislocations.”  Id.  In addition “[n]et losses of $6.5 billion resulting primarily from write-
downs and losses on asset sales across residential mortgage-related exposures and 
commercial real estate exposures.”  Id.  Finally, “[n]et losses of $2.1 billion due to write-
downs on private equity investments.”  Id.  There were other non-super senior ABS CDO 
related factors that drew down returns, including:  additional dividends related to a 
mandatory exchange of convertible stock; a payment to Temasek Holdings of Singapore; a 
goodwill impairment related to the related to investment banking businesses; a fine and 
settlement related to auction rate securities; and a restructuring charge related to headcount 
reduction.  Id. at 18. 
  UBS AG was another bank that was hard hit by Super Senior 
 283. CITIGROUP, INC., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2008). 
 284. Kenneth C. Johnston et al., The Subprime Morass: Past Present and Future, 12 
N.C. BANKING INST. 125, 135 (2008). 
 285. CITIGROUP, INC., supra note 283, at 10. 
 286. Id.  Citigroup also had non-super senior ABS CDO related write-downs and losses 
that appear to relate to market conditions rather than reckless risk taking.  Of the $14.1 
billion in write-downs attributable to ABS CDO exposure, $1 billion was not related to 
super senior ABS CDOs.  Id. at 68. Some of the monoline insurance exposure also was 
related to non-super senior ABS CDOs, but an exact amount was not quoted.  Id. at 10.  
Furthermore, “[d]ue to the dislocation of the credit markets and the reduced market interest 
in higher-risk/higher-yield instruments since the latter half of 2007 . . . [Citigroup] 
record[ed] pretax write-downs on funded and unfunded highly leveraged finance exposures 
of $4.9 billion in 2008.”  Id. at 71.  Citigroup also sustained good will and wrote down 
intangible asset impairment charges worth $10.7 billion, primarily ($9.6 billion worth) due 
to the “overall weak industry outlook and continuing operating losses.”  Id. at 201.  In 
addition, Citigroup had $18.3 billion in write-downs from lending and structuring exposures 
in the subprime markets.  Id. at 10.  Citigroup also posted $3.3 billion in losses related to 
structured investment vehicle (SIV) trading through November 18, 2008, as well as $2.6 
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write-offs.  Of its $18.7 billion in losses from U.S. subprime exposures, 
fifty percent were due to Super Seniors.287
AIG had no idea that it was incurring excessive risk in its Super 
Senior CDS.  AIG assured investors in August 2007 that “[i]t is hard for us, 
without being flippant, to even see a scenario within any kind of realm of 
reason that would see us losing $1 in any of those transactions.”
 
288  AIG 
was weakened after it wrote off $11.12 billion on Super Senior CDS in the 
fourth quarter of 2007 and another $9.11 billion in the first quarter of 
2008.289  AIG noted that these were marked-to-market, unrealized losses 
due to fair value accounting and that it did not expect to have an actual 
material loss from these exposures.290  AIG’s CEO, Martin Sullivan also 
blamed mark-to-market accounting requirements for the losses sustained by 
AIGFP.291  Sullivan complained that AIG was required to markdown its 
inventories even if it had no intention of selling them.292  He may have had 
a point, as this was a common complaint in the industry.293
 
billion worth of pre-tax losses, net of hedges, on commercial real estate exposure.  Id. at 11.  
Finally, an auction rate securities settlement added $926 million to Citigroup’s 2008 losses.  
Id. at 13. 
  Indeed, at the 
 287. UBS AG, supra note 152, § 4.2.3, at 14. 
 288. Robert O’Harrow, Jr. & Brady Dennis, Downgrades And Downfall: How could a 
single unit of AIG cause the giant company's near-ruin and become a fulcrum of the global 
financial crisis? By straying from its own rules for managing risk and then failing to 
anticipate the consequences, WASH. POST, Dec. 31 2008, at A01. 
 289. AIG Reports First Quarter Results, AIG NEWS (Am. Int’l Group, Inc., New York, 
N.Y.), May 8, 2008, available at http://media.corporate-
ir.net/media_files/irol/76/76115/releases/1Q08_release.pdf. 
 290. AIG Issues Statement on Super Senior CDS Loss Risk, BUSINESS WIRE, Feb. 12, 
2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUS151781+12-Feb-
2008+BW20080212. 
 291. AIG’s risk model predicted that, based on historic default rates, the economy would 
have to fall into depression before AIG would experience losses from its CDS.  Robert 
O’Harrow Jr. & Brady Dennis, Complex Deals Veiled Risk for AIG—2nd of Three Parts, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/01/business/fi-
aig1. 
 292. David Reilly, Wave of Write-Offs Rattles Market: Accounting Rules Blasted as Dow 
Falls; A $600 Billion Toll?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2008, at A1. 
 293. It has been noted that: 
The foundational ideas associated with fair value accounting were adopted by 
FASB in Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) 115 [in 1993]. 
The rule divided financial assets into three categories—those held “to maturity,” 
those held “for trading purposes,” and those “available for sale.” Each of these 
categories is treated slightly differently. Assets held to maturity are valued at 
amortized cost; assets held for trading are marked to market, with unrealized 
gains or losses included in earnings; and assets deemed available for sale are 
marked to market, with unrealized gains or losses excluded from earnings but 
included in shareholders’ equity. 
Peter J. Wallison, Fair Value Accounting: A Critique, FIN. SERVICES OUTLOOK (Am. 
Enterprise Inst. for Pub. Pol’y, Washington D.C.), July 2008, at 2.  That concept was further 
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end of the second quarter in 2009, AIG posted a $184 million unrealized 
market gain on its super senior CDS portfolio, due mainly to the substantial 
decline in outstanding net notional amount resulting from the termination 
of contracts in the fourth quarter of 2008, as well as to the narrowing of 
corporate credit spreads.294
AIG’s most serious liquidity problem came from the collateral it had 
to post on its CDS portfolio on Super Senior CDOs.  In July and August 
2008, the continuing decline in value of the Super Senior CDO securities 
protected by AIGFP CDS, together with ratings downgrades of such CDO 
securities, resulted in AIGFP posting massive amounts of additional 
collateral.
 
295  “As of the end of August 2008, AIG had posted 
approximately $19.7 billion of collateral under its super senior credit 
default swap portfolio.”296  However, billions of dollars in collateral for 
CDS was flowing back into AIG in the second quarter of 2009 as the credit 
market began a recovery.297
Fair value pricing resulted in a pro-cyclical progression of write-
downs that bore no relation to actual value.
 
298  “The difficulty in putting a 
value on loans, securities, and exotic financial instruments banks were 
carrying on their books became one of the most debilitating features of the 
Great Panic” in 2008.299
 
advanced with FASB’s SFAS 157, which was adopted in 2006, just as the subprime market 
peaked, and became effective for fiscal years beginning after November 15, 2007.  SFAS 
157 specified how fair value was to be reached, placing the most emphasis on the use of 
market prices when available.  Id at 3. 
  Critics of fair value accounting charged that, 
because liquidity in subprime investments had dried up as the subprime 
 294. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., 2009 Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 5 (Aug. 7, 2009). 
 295. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., 2008 Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Mar. 2, 2009). 
Collateral calls by some large institutions totaling $27.1 billion were paid in full when the 
government stepped into bailout AIG.  Tom Braithwaite, Geithner Faces Fresh Fire Over 
AIG Deal, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 28, 2010, at 1.  Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner was 
criticized harshly in Congress for paying those calls in full while head of the New York 
Federal Reserve Bank.  Id.  It was claimed that he was protecting Goldman Sachs and others 
making these collateral calls from losses and that he could have negotiated down the 
amounts of those payments.  Id. 
 296. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., supra note 295, at 40.  AIG also had $55.5 billion in net 
realized capital losses, which included the following: (1) sales of fixed maturities - $5.3 
billion; (2) Other-than-temporary impairments, severity - $29.2 billion; (3) Other-than-
temporary impairments, lack of intent to hold to recovery - $12.1 billion; (4) Other-than-
temporary impairments, foreign currency declines - $1.9 billion; (5) Other-than-temporary 
impairments, issuer-specific credit events - $6 billion; (6) Other-than-temporary 
impairments, adverse projected cash flows on structured securities - $1.7  billion; and (7) 
Derivative instruments - $3.7 billion. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., supra note 294, at 67.  These 
losses appear largely to be related to fair value accounting.  Id. at 61, 67. 
 297. Liam Plevin, In Reversal of Fortune, AIG Recoups Collateral, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 
2009, at A25. 
 298. Id. 
 299. WESSEL, supra note 6, at 128. 
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crisis blossomed, the only prices available for “fair value” accounting were 
fire sale prices from desperate sellers.  Those prices in no way reflected the 
actual value of the Super Seniors as measured by their cash flows or 
defaults.  One accountant complained to the FASB, “[m]ay the souls of 
those who developed FASB 157 burn in the seventh circle of Dante’s 
Hell.”300  Warren Buffett likened mark-to-market requirements for 
measuring bank regulatory capital to throwing “gasoline on the fire in 
terms of financial institutions.”301
B. Interest Rates 
 
 Interest rate policies also bear scrutiny as a precipitating factor in 
the subprime crisis.  The ten-year bull market that preceded the stock 
market crash in 2000 was an era of high expectations as stock market 
indexes exploded in value, reaching heights undreamed of in earlier years.  
The Dow Jones Industrial Average doubled twice during that bull market, 
reaching a height of 11722 on January 14, 2000.302  Spurred by the growth 
of the high-tech “dot.com” companies that had exploited the Internet in 
numerous innovative ways, the stock market bubble in the 1990s was said 
to be the result of “irrational exuberance” by Alan Greenspan, the then 
Federal Reserve Board Chairman.303  It was also attributed to low interest 
rates encouraged by the Fed.304
 
 300. Accounting Principles, 40 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1767 (Oct. 27, 2008). 
  Greenspan single-handedly broke the 
 301. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Buffett’s Unmentionable Bank Solution, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
11, 2009, at A13; see also American Int’l Group, Inc., 2009 Quarterly Report for the Period 
Ending 30 June, 2009 (Form 10-Q), at 61, 67 (Aug. 7, 2009) (disclosing ongoing 
investigations by the SEC and DOJ of its valuation of its super senior credit default swap 
portfolio under fair value accounting rules).  As one author noted: 
The argument against fair value is a compelling one:  volatile markets make 
securities valuation difficult and undermine investors’ confidence, forcing 
companies to mark down values, leading to greater illiquidity and further 
markdowns. The more the markdowns impair capital, the greater the loss of 
investor confidence, and the faster the churn of the self-reinforcing cycle. 
Todd Davenport, Fair Value: Few Fans, But Fewer Alternatives, 173 AM. BANKER 1 (Mar. 
24, 2008). 
 302. Greg Ip, Greenspan Issues Hopeful Outlook As Stocks SinkBut He Warns Loss of 
Trust Caused by `Infectious Greed' Could Undercut Recovery, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2002, at 
A1. 
 303. E.S. Browning, Dow Leaps in Skeptics’ Rally:  Cheap Money Sends Shares to 2009 
High, Gold Over $1,100; Dollar’s Dive Continues, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2009, at A1. 
 304. E.S. Browning, Greg Ip, and Leslie Scism, What Correction? With Dazzling Speed, 
Market Roars Back To Another New High—Surge Puts the Dow at 9374 In a Lightning 
Reversal Of Autumn's Doldrums—`Nothing to Get in Its Way,' WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1998, 
at A1. 
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dot.com bubble through a series of punitive interest rate increases.305  
Trillions of dollars in stock values evaporated in the ensuing downturn.306  
The Fed’s actions also helped push the country into a near recession that 
greeted the newly inaugurated forty-third President of the United States, 
George W. Bush.  Although the Fed reversed course and started slashing 
interest rates in January 2001, that action was too little and too late to 
prevent a downturn.307
The fed funds rate was 6.51 percent in November 2000.
 
308  It dropped 
to nearly one percent in July 2003.309  This triggered a housing mania in the 
United States.  In order to crush the real estate bubble that fed on those low 
rates, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan began a series of seventeen 
consecutive interest rate increases beginning on June 30, 2004.310  Ben 
Bernanke—who replaced Alan Greenspan as the Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Board in a peaceful transfer of power on February 1, 2006—
picked up the cudgel and continued Greenspan’s efforts with still more 
interest rate increases.311  The effects of those actions were already 
manifesting themselves as Bernanke assumed office.  Indeed, the housing 
market experienced the largest decline in new home sales in over ten years 
in the months after Bernanke became the Fed Chairman.312
Undeterred by that rather ominous news, Bernanke imposed another 
rate increase on March 28, 2006.
 
313  This was the fifteenth straight interest 
rate increase, and Bernanke suggested more rate increases would be 
forthcoming.  He proved true to his word with a sixteenth straight rate 
increase on May 10, 2006, pushing short-term rates to five percent.314  The 
seventeenth consecutive increase came on June 29, 2006, increasing short-
term rates to 5.25 percent.315
 
   305.   JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN CORPORATE SCANDALS: 
FROM ENRON TO REFORM, ch. 2 (2005). 
  The effect of this onslaught on the real estate 
 306. David Wessel, Capital:  Great Expectations And Greenspan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 
2001, at A1. 
 307. Greg Ip and Jacob M. Schlesinger, Economic Fix: As Fed Trims Rates, Other 
Forces Work To Dilute the BenefitsConsumer Debt, Slow Exports And Corporate Jitters 
Damp Jump-Start BidMarkets Lose More Ground, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2001, at A1. 
 308. E.S. Browning, Stocks Fall Back Before Meeting Of Fed on Rates, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 11, 2001, at C1. 
 309. David Wessel, The Economy—Capital:  Deflation Spurs Fed to Talk More, but With 
No Uptick in Clarity, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2003, at A2. 
 310. The Associated Press, Shares Close Mixed as Earnings Reports Fail to Inspire, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2007, at C1. 
 311. ETHAN S. HARRIS, BEN BERNANKE’S FED 32 (2008). 
 312. Paul Krugman, Coming Down To Earth, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2006, at A25. 
 313. Greg Ip, Fed Raises Rates By 1/4 Point, Hints More May Come—Bernanke's Debut 
Statement Shows New Transparency; Stocks Fall, Bond Yields Rise, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 
2006. 
 314. HARRIS, supra note 311 at 176. 
 315. The Associated Press, supra note 310. 
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market culminated in a financial crisis in 2007.  Home sales and new 
residential construction slowed dramatically, and the market became 
glutted with unsold homes.316
The Fed then began slashing rates once again, pushing short-term rates 
to near zero.
 
317  This raises the question of whether another bubble is being 
formed in one asset class or another that will eventually break in the future 
with devastating effects on the economy.  In the off-season, the Fed focuses 
on inflation and has grand debates over “targeted” inflation rates and other 
approaches to taming inflation.318
The Fed certainly has a role to play in fighting inflation, as proved by 
Paul Volcker in the 1980s, but more certainty could be added by indexing 
interest rates to the rate of core inflation.  This would, once again, allow 
more flexible financial planning when inflation is on the rise.  This is not a 
new idea.  John Taylor, a Stanford economics professor, posited the 
“Taylor Rule,” which created a formula for “setting interest rates that 
depended on where inflation was versus the Fed’s goal for it, how far from 
full employment the economy was, and what the short term rate should be 
when the economy was perking along.”
  Those debates and policies dominate Fed 
thinking until there is an economic crisis that causes concerns over inflation 
to be abandoned, but not until a significant amount of damage has been 
done to the economy.  This approach is wrong-headed, and should be 
corrected by adding more certainty to the process in order to allow better 
business and economic planning.  The Fed needs to adopt a targeted rate of 
interest, which it can lower or raise gradually, according to a prescribed 
formula, as inflation or other economic conditions dictate, but always with 
a view to returning to the equilibrium interest rate target.  This will allow 
businesses to plan for increased, or decreased, interest rates without having 
to read the tea leafs to determine what the Fed will do in any given 
circumstance. 
319
Any interest rate changes should be measured and slow.  The effects 
of interest rate changes are not visible for some months, a fact that induced 
the Fed to adopt a series of rapid interest rate changes in order to obtain a 
more rapid result, but it overplayed its hand in taking that approach.  
Inevitably, too much was done, with the effect of crashing the economy or 
setting off a bubble.  As of this writing, the Fed Fund target rate is near 
zero, and the Fed has given only the vaguest of suggestions concerning its 
 
 
 316. Jack Healy, October Report Shows Home Prices Down 18% From Last Year, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2008, at B3. 
 317. Edmund L. Andrews, Fed’s Minutes Reveal Shock at Downturn, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 
2009, at B1. 
 318. Bob Davis, World News: IMF Tells Bankers to Rethink Inflation, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
12, 2010, at A10. 
 319. WESSEL, supra note 6, at 122. 
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future rate policy.  The only guidance the Fed has provided was that rates 
would stay low for an “extended period,” which means at least six 
months.320  However, a Fed governor, Kevin Warsh, stated in September 
2009 that when the Fed does decide to increase rates, it would do it “with 
greater swiftness” than it has in the past, indicating that the Fed has learned 
nothing from observing the effects of its roller coaster rate changes.321
C. Business Judgment Failures 
 
 The regulated banks, rating agencies, and the “shadow” banking 
world of subprime non-banks and mortgage brokers must also bear some 
responsibility for the subprime crisis.  However, those failures cannot be 
tied to the GLBA.  The “no-doc,” “low-doc,” stated income (“liar loans”) 
and “Ninja” (no income, no job, no assets) and “teaser” rate loans were 
sometimes irresponsibly underwritten on the belief that an ever-rising 
housing market would allow refinancings and avoid foreclosure.322
Risk assessment models failed to predict the subprime crisis.  A risk 
model developed by David Li, the Gaussian Copula correlation model, did 
for collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) what the Black-Scholes model 
did for options.
  That 
belief proved faulty in the downturn.  The larger banks failed in their due 
diligence in the creditworthiness of the subprime borrowers.  There seemed 
to be a marked decline in subprime credit quality as the crisis approached.  
Mortgage lending to only creditworthy customers is a bank function that 
Glass-Steagall did not address. 
323  Seemingly, it allowed a precise mathematical 
computation of the risks posed by these instruments.  In fact, the Gaussian 
Copula models were simply not designed to forecast such an event.  The 
Basel II accord for bank capital also allowed the use of Value-at-Risk 
(“VaR”) models for commercial bank risk assessment,324
 
 320. Krishna Guha & Michael Mackenzie, Fed Sees Six More Months of Low Rates, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Nov. 5, 2009, at 1; Kevin M. Warsh, The Fed's Job Is Only Half Over, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2009, at A15. 
 but they were 
 321. Jon Hilsenrath, Fed Official Sees Faster Rate Increases in Future, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 26-27, 2009, at A2.  The Fed was under attack by Congressman Ron Paul who was 
able to gain enough support to insert a provision in the regulatory reform legislation pending 
in the House Financial Services Committee that would require GAO audits of Fed monetary 
policy.  Audit the Fed Amendment Passes 43-26!, RONPAUL.COM, Nov. 19, 2009, 
http://www.ronpaul.com/2009-11-19/audit-the-fed-amendment-passes-43-26/.  Paul also 
advocated abolishing the Fed.  RON PAUL, END THE FED (2009). 
 322. See MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 111 (describing these abuses). 
 323. TETT, supra note 278, at 101-02. 
 324. See generally, Elene Spanakos, Harmonization of International Adequacy Rules for 
Securities Firms: An Argument to Implement the Value at Risk Approach by Adopting 
Basil’s Internal Model Methodology, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 221 (2000) (discussing the role 
of VaR). 
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based on bell curve assessments that did not recognize the outliers—the 
“Black Swan” unpredictable events.  The rating agencies suffered the same 
flaw in the models they used for granting Triple-A status to the Super 
Seniors.  The rating agencies used risk models for awarding the triple-A 
rating that did not take into account the possibility of a major downturn in 
the real estate market.325
Critics of GLBA have asserted that the commercial banks greatly 
leveraged their balance sheets following the repeal of Glass-Steagall by 
increasing their ratio of debt to equity.
 
326  However, banks have always 
been highly leveraged institutions that were dependent on deposit liabilities 
to fund much of their operations.  Increased leverage was also a function of 
changes in regulatory capital requirements that sought to limit bank 
leverage.  That process began in 1988 with the “Basel Accord,” formulated 
by the Basel Committee at the Bank for International Settlements.  That 
committee was composed of a group of central bankers and regulators, 
including those in the United States.  The capital formula in that Accord 
proved to be too inflexible, and a risk-based approach was adopted in Basel 
II instead.  That process began in 1999, coinciding with the passage of 
GLBA, but does not appear to be related to its passage.  It was also 
mistakenly thought that Basel II would increase capital cushions and 
decrease leverage.327
VII. CONCLUSION 
  That flaw was due to the assumption that the triple-A 
rated Super Senior tranches of the CDOs were safe and did not require a 
large capital cushion. 
The claim that the removal of the dividing line between commercial 
and investment banking activities laid the groundwork for the subprime 
crisis does not seem to be supported by the record.  Commercial banks 
were forced into subprime lending by the Community Reinvestment Act of 
1977, and they were encouraged by the government to securitize those 
mortgages before the enactment of GLBA.  Government-housing policies, 
artificially low interest rates, misapplications of fair value accounting 
standards, defective risk models, and sheer greed and ineptitude by 
mortgage lenders and brokers appear to be the real culprits in the subprime 
crisis, not the right honourable Messers Gramm, Leach and Bliley. 
 
 
 325. For a lively discussion of those flaws, see NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK 
SWAN (2007). 
 326. CHARLES GASPARINO, THE SELLOUT 154 (2007). 
 327. For a discussion of the development of Basel II, see BROOME & MARKHAM, supra 
note 84, at 519-25. 
